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Does the disbandment of the Southern African Development Community1  Tribunal2 established 
in terms of article 2 of The Protocol on Tribunal & Rules Thereof3 and its impending 
resurrection, in arguably a largely diminished capacity, spell the end of any possibility of 
developing a truly supranational organ capable of adjudicating on disputes between Member 
States, as well as disputes between natural persons and Member States4 as was originally 
envisaged in article 15?5 
The basis of this research question stems from the disbandment of the Tribunal arguably as a 
result of Zimbabwe‟s controversial land redistribution program, along with the recent 
developments surrounding the Tribunal insofar as the redrafting of the Protocol (the New 
Protocol) is concerned. 
Prior to the disbandment of the Tribunal many scholars were of the view that the adoption of 
human rights instruments, such as the Tribunal which could hold Member States accountable for 
respecting human rights, was testament to a growing acceptance by African governments of 
human rights principles.6 Furthermore, that these instruments could in themselves persuade 
African Governments to uphold human rights principles.7 
However, the abovementioned status quo recently seems to have shifted from that of an 
optimistic view to a more pessimistic narrative, the cause of this drastic shift can be traced back 
to the effective disbandment of the Tribunal and the New Protocol currently being discussed 
amongst Member States. 
This paper intends on illustrating what lessons can be learnt from the disbandment of the 
Tribunal by the Member States, with a view to allowing those lessons to assist in establishing a 
                                                          
1Southern African Development Community herein after referred to as “SADC” 
2 Southern African Development Community Tribunal herein after referred to as “the Tribunal” 
3 The Protocol on Tribunal & Rules Thereof, 2000 hereinafter referred to as “the Protocol”; the redrafted Protocol on 
Tribunal & Rules Thereof, yet to be assented too by SADC shall herein after be referred to as “the New Protocol” 
4 Article 1 of The Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 1992, herein after referred to as “the 
SADC Treaty”, defines Member State as “a member of SADC” 
5Supra note 4 
6 Laurie Nathan “The Disbandment of the SADC Tribunal: A Cautionary Tale” (2013) Human Rights Quarterly, vol 




supranational instrument capable of adjudicating conflicts between Member States whilst being 
cognisant of their respective undertakings to observe human rights principles. 
The first part of this paper shall commence with a brief discussion on the elaborate legal edifice 
upon which SADC has been built on, touching on the various protocols and legal instruments 
adopted by the Member States with a view to achieving the objectives set out in the SADC 
Treaty. Therefore the focus of the first part of this paper is an analysis of SADC‟s constitutive 
documents whilst briefly examining the legal edifice upon which the European Communities, 
specifically the European Economic Community, is built on. 
The second part of this paper shall be a comparative analysis conducted on the European 
Economic Community / European Union and SADC with regards to the operation of courts 
within the European Union versus the operation of the Tribunal. The focus being on the level of 
application and enforcement of judgements handed down by the instruments in their respective 
member states. 
 
The third part of this paper shall be an analysis of the Protocol vis a vis  the New Protocol, whilst 
highlighting any strengths or weaknesses of the new legal text in contrast to the old. The fourth 
part of this paper shall deal with the litigation which stemmed from the Zimbabwe‟s land reform 
program, with specific focus on the case of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of 
Zimbabwe (2/2007) [2008] SADCT 2 (28 November 2008).8 This chapter shall also explore the 
conflict of laws which presented itself in the case of Gramara (Pvt) Ltd v. Government of the 
Republic of Zimbabwe (HC 33/09) [2010] ZWHHC [Harare High Court].9  The focus in the latter 
case being on the debate between what should be the more persuasive consideration when public 
policy is at odds with a foreign judgment. 
 
The final part of this paper shall seek to plot a way forward concerning the resurrection of the 
Tribunal. The „way forward‟ taking into consideration the lessons learnt from the various court 
cases surrounding the Zimbabwe‟s land redistribution program and drawing on the model of the 
                                                          
8 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007) [2008] SADCT 2 (28 November 2008) 
herein after referred to as the “Campbell Case” 
9
 Gramara (Pvt) Ltd v. Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe (HC 33/09) [2010] ZWHHC [Harare High Court] 
hereinafter referred to as the “Gramara Case” 
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European Communities. However, the emphasis shall be to attempt to tailor a proposed model 




































The formation of SADC can be traced back to a meeting of leaders of the so called „frontline 
states‟ which included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho and Mozambique, held in Arusha, Tanzania, 
July 1979.10 Part of the agenda for the meeting was the possible formation of a development co-
ordination organisation, mooted at this meeting, to provide an economic dimension to the 
political struggles in Southern Africa against colonial minority rule.11 The establishment of such 
an instrument was also seen as a mechanism of providing the frontline states with a better form 
of defence in withstanding political and economic domination, not to mention destabilisation of 
the region by the apartheid regime in South Africa12. 
 
Eleven years after the meeting held in Arusha, followed a summit in Lusaka, Zambia, whereby a 
declaration was issued by the summit providing for the formal creation of the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (“SADCC”). In hindsight the SADCC would turn out to 
be the precursor to SADC. Amongst the objectives of the SADCC listed the pursuit of the 
following objectives13: 
1. Reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa. 
2. Forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration. 
3. Mobilisation of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional 
policies. 
4. Concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of the strategy for the 
economic liberation. 
 
Within a decade of its incorporation, after initially enjoying praise and acclaim, support for 
SADCC began to wane due to the modest results produced by the organisation since its 
inception. Problems facing the SADCC were numerous, such as an over reliance by the SADCC 
                                                          
10 Clement Ng‟ong‟ola „The Reconstitution of the Southern African Development Community: Some International 






on international donors due to the organisations inability to fund its own programs.14 Funding 
issues as well as the unsuccessful attempt to reduce economic dependence on the Republic of 
South Africa proved problematic, the latter being further complicated by the prospect of the fall 
of Apartheid. However, the fall of Apartheid also presented itself as an opportunity for the 
inclusion of South Africa and the re-orientation of Southern African Integration.15 
 
SADC: Legal Order 
In the wake of the problems face by the SADCC, in 1993, the SADC Treaty was concluded 
transforming the pre-existing SADCC into a new institution namely SADC.16 The reconstitution 
of the SADCC into SADC was effected through the conclusion of the SADC Treaty as well as 
the conclusion of various other declarations. 
 
South Africa‟s accession to SADC following its conversion to a democratic state characterised 
by majority rule, called for a revision of the objectives of SADC, as these borrowed largely from 
those of the SADCC. The revision of SADC‟s objectives was namely to do with the deletion of 
references regarding the „reduction of economic dependence particularly, but not only, on the 
Republic of South Africa‟.17 
 
Since its formation, SADC has been built on an elaborate legal edifice centred on its founding 
treaty and buttressed by protocols on politics and security, extradition, mining, and a range of 
other topics.18 The SADC Treaty can be described as the first building block of SADC‟s legal 
edifice which the elaborate legal mechanisms governing the operation of SADC revolve around. 
 
In respect of SADC‟s institutional framework, SADC has been established as an international 
organisation, with distinct legal personality, capacity and powers19 to enter into contracts and 
perform various other ancillary tasks associated with juristic persons. As is customary with the 
establishment of a supranational organization, all Member States were required to make the 
                                                          
14
 Ng‟ong‟ola op cit note 10 at 268 
15 Ibid 
16 Frans Viljoen, International Human Rights Law In Africa, 2 ed Oxford University Press (2012) at 477 
17 ibid 
18 Nathan op cit note 6 at 872 
19 Article 3 supra note 4 
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necessary amendments to their national laws as such to enable SADC to have the necessary 
powers for the proper fulfillment of its functions. 
Upon its reconstitution SADC adopted various objectives with its primary aim being to “achieve 
development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of 
the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional 
integration”.20 
Other ancillary objectives, development orientated by nature, including the following: 
1. “the promotion of self sustaining development on the basis of collective self reliance and 
interdependence of Member States; 
2. achieving sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the 
environment; 
3. achieving complementarity between national and regional development and utilization of the 
resources of the region; and 
4. strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and 
links among the peoples of the region”.21 
The SADC Treaty sets out a wide array of activities to be undertaken by the Member States in 
the pursuit of the objectives set out, however most importantly the Member States are all obliged 
to commit to various general undertakings to ensure the realisation of SADC‟s objectives. These 
including undertaking to adopt adequate measures to promote the achievement of the objectives 
of SADC, refraining from taking any measure likely to jeopardise the sustenance of its 
principles, the achievement of its objectives and the implementation of the provisions of the 
SADC Treaty.22 Furthermore, Member States undertook to take all necessary steps to accord the 
SADC Treaty the force of national law as well as to cooperate with and assist the institutions of 
SADC in the performance of their duties.23 
                                                          
20 Article 5 (1)(a) supra note 4 
21 Article 5(1)(d)-(h) supra note 4 
22 Article 6(1) supra note 4 
23 Article 6(5) - (6) supra note 4 
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Article 924 establishes six institutions to carry out the proper functioning of SADC, namely, the 
Summit of Heads of State or Government (“the Summit”); the Council of Ministers (“the 
Council”); Commissions; the Secretariat and the Tribunal.25 The Summit consists of the heads of 
state of all Member States and is SADC‟s highest decision making body26, responsible for 
making binding decisions on the overall policy direction and control of the functions of SADC.27 
The Council consists of one minister from each Member State28 and has various responsibilities 
including, the functioning and development of SADC; overseeing the implementation of the 
policies of SADC, and the proper execution of its policies. Critically, the Council is responsible 
for approving policies, strategies, and the work programs of SADC.29 Article 11(2)(d) of the 
SADC Treaty provides that the Council shall be responsible for approving policies, strategies 
and work programs giving an indication on the wide ranging powers bestowed upon the Council 
by the SADC Treaty. Thus the Council can be seen as the main driver of SADC responsible for 
the organization meeting its objectives, however with no binding decision making authority. 
In attending to its duties the Council is assisted by the Secretariat which is the principal 
executive institution of SADC responsible for tasks such as strategic planning and management 
of SADC‟s programs as well as the implementation of the decisions of the Summit. Thus the 
Secretariat, with the assistance of experts and lawyers, attends to drafting protocols and policy 
documents negotiated by government officials and ministers, discussed and approved by the 
Summit and signed by the heads of state.30 
In order to assist Member State‟s to comply with their legal obligations under the SADC Treaty 
in respect of assigning the SADC Treaty force of law in each member State31, bearing in mind 
the legal expertise required to conduct such a task and the relative under development of many of 
                                                          
24 Supra note 4 
25 Article 9(1)(a)-(f) supra note 4 
26 Article 10(8) supra note 4 
27 Article 10(2) supra note 4 
28 Article 11(1) supra note 4 
29 Article 11(2)(a),(b) & (d) supra note 4 
30 Nathan op cit note 6 at 873 
31 Article 6(5) Supra note 4 
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the Member States, the Council resolved to create SADC‟s Legal Sector, established by way of 
the Protocol on Legal Affairs.32 
The objective of creating the Legal Sector was to establish an organ which could provide legal 
assistance to not only Member States but also SADC and its institutions in the interpretation and 
implementation of the SADC Treaty.33 
As has previously been stated, the constitutive document of SADC is the SADC Treaty which in 
turn acts as the foundation of SADC‟s entire legal edifice. In support of the SADC Treaty 
various other documents have been discussed and approved by the Summit in order to act as 
legal aids to help SADC achieve its objectives. These various other documents include protocols 
in respect of the areas of cooperation amongst Member States, setting out the objectives, scope 
and institutional mechanisms for cooperation and integration amongst Member States.34 
Protocols approved by the Summit form an integral part of the SADC Treaty35 and are in respect 
to a wide array of area‟s of cooperation such as trade, investment, peace and security.36 
In buttressing the SADC Treaty and the various protocols approved by the Summit, SADC‟s 
legal order also enjoys the aid of a vast variety of declarations, memorandums of understanding, 
pacts, policies and strategy papers namely the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan37 
(“RISDP”). The RISDP which in corroboration with the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ 
(“SIPO”) are the principal documents informing SADC‟s strategies with regards to all areas of 
cooperation by Member States. This complex myriad of documentation makes up the legal 
edifice of SADC. 
For purposes of this paper, the most significant institution established by Article 9 of the SADC 
Treaty is the Tribunal. The Tribunal was constituted in order to ensure adherence and proper 
interpretation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty and all subsidiary instruments related 
thereto, as well as to adjudicate on any disputes referred to it by Member States.38 The Tribunal 
became operational in November 2005 with its establishment initially signaling the beginning of 
                                                          
32 Protocol on Legal Affairs, 2000 
33 Article 2(a) supra note 32 
34 Article 22(1) supra note 4 
35 Article 22(2) supra note 4 
36 Article 21(3) supra note 4 
37 Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, 2005 
38 Article 16(1) supra note 4 
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a new era. An era whereby it was hoped that Southern African states would accept a limitation to 
their hard fought sovereignty through international judicial supervision. This optimism was 
triggered as a result of the Tribunal being empowered to make binding decisions in respect of 
disputes referred to it.39 
Arguably the most significant document adopted by SADC has been the Protocol.  The 
significance of the Protocol can be drawn from the significant powers the Tribunal has been 
empowered with under the SADC Treaty. Powers set out in articles 32 to 35 of the SADC Treaty 
concerning sanctions, withdrawals from SADC and the referral of disputes. In this regard all 
disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the SADC Treaty shall be referred to the 
Tribunal, should such disputes be incapable of amicable resolution.40 Therefore, granting the 
Tribunal exclusive jurisdiction regarding disputes amongst Member States, and placing the 
Tribunal as the final arbiter in such disputes. An important task considering the vast area‟s of 
cooperation covered by SADC open to dispute between the Member States due to each states 
competing interests. 
Furthermore, article 33(1)(a) of the SADC Treaty provides that sanctions may be imposed on 
any Member State which persistently fails to fulfill its obligations under the SADC Treaty 
without good reason. Although the Member States have undertaken specific and general 
obligations under articles 5(2) and 641 respectively, the effect of article 32, is to place an extra 
obligation on the Member States insofar as being precluded from referring disputes, to any other 
arbiter but for the Tribunal, for purposes of seeking relief. 
The SADC Treaty is silent in respect of the form of sanctions which may be imposed by the 
Summit on Member States failing to meet their obligations in respect of the SADC Treaty except 
to say that they shall be determined on a case by case basis.42 One can opine that the form of 
sanction envisaged is of an economic nature as is general practice globally. 
When reading the abovementioned sections cumulatively it is clear that whereby a Member State 
fails to meet its obligations insofar as either failing to refer a dispute to the Tribunal, taking 
                                                          
39 Article 16(5) supra note 4 
40 Article 32 supra note 4 
41 supra note 4 
42 Article 33(2) supra note 4 
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unilateral action against an offending Member State or alternatively failing adhere to the 
Tribunals rulings, Member States shall be in breach of their obligations under the SADC Treaty. 
Therefore giving the Tribunal persuasive powers insofar as the operation of SADC. 
In conclusion the Tribunals persuasive powers can be seen to be that should a Member State 
breach its obligations under the SADC Treaty and be directed to remedy such breach by the 
Tribunal, failure to do so grants the Tribunal the power to escalate the infraction to the Summit 
for appropriate action. Thus representing the Tribunals sway with regards to its ability to 






















The European Communities consisting of the European Coal and Steel Community (“ECSC”), 
European Economic Community (“EC”) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(“Euratom”)43 are the European equivalent to Africa‟s Regional Economic Communities 
(“REC‟s”). The Communities at their inception were created for purposes of achieving greater 
economic integration amongst their members and eventually leading to political integration. 
Similar to how Africa‟s REC‟s form the nucleus of the African Union the Communities form the 
nucleus of the European Union44 and have from their very foundation had the express aim of 
European integration. 
With the aforementioned in mind, the objective of this chapter shall be an attempt to briefly 
examine the legal edifice upon which the European Union was built on. The focus being on the 
functions of the institutions established in order to drive the organisation. The purpose of the 
aforementioned being to highlight how a Eurocentric approach has been followed in the 
establishment of SADC. 
The history of the Communities begins in the 1950‟s when the French foreign minister, Robert 
Schuman, proposed the merger of the coal and steel industries of France and Germany.45 The 
intention being that pooling of their resources under the authority of a supranational instrument 
would dissuade the possibility of any further conflicts between the two nations. The pooling of 
resources was seen as a platform for the integrated economic growth of the two nations. 
After nine months of negotiations the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community46   was signed in Paris on 18 April 195147 with effect from 25 July 1952. According 
                                                          
43 Cumulatively herein after referred to as “the Communities”; 
44 O F Robinson T D Fergus W M Gordon European Legal History 3ed Butterworths London (2000) 309 
45Ibid at 310 
46 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 1951 herein after referred to as the “Treaty of Paris” 
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to Article 9748 of the Treaty of Paris, the treaty was to subsist for a period of 50 years and thus 
ceased to be of force and effect in July 2002. Therefore with the Treaty of Paris‟s effective 
termination the ECSC was „integrated‟ into the European Community49. 
In 1956 the foreign ministers of the ECSC member states met in Venice and adopted what was to 
be known as the Spaak Report. The Spaak Report argued that achieving economic integration by 
way of a sector-by-sector approach would be difficult when it eventually came to fully 
integrating the European economies. Meaning that a sectorial approach to integration via coal 
and steel was inappropriate in realising a fully integrated European economy. 
The Spaak Report thus broadly set out a proposed outline for the measures required to be 
implemented in the establishment of a common market, the first step towards economic 
integration. This became the basis for future negotiations around treaties50 aimed at economic 
integration. The goal of the meeting in Venice was to achieve political integration however in the 
immediate future the only way towards the achievement of this lay by way of firstly 
commencing with economic integration.51 
The result of the adoption of the Spaak Report and the meeting in Venice was the conclusion of 
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community.52 
As of 1958 three communities existed namely the EC, ECSC and Euratom, of the three 
communities the latter two were subject specific, meaning that their aims and objectives were 
specific to economic sectors i.e. steel, coal and nuclear. The EC on the other hand was not, its 
scope was broad enough to cover any economic activity included in that of the other two 
communities as well as those falling outside of their scope. The result being that the EC became 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
47 P J G Kapetyn & P VerLoren van Themaat Introduction to the Law of the European Communities 3 ed Kluwer 
Law International (1998) at 7 
48 Ibid 
49 Klaus-Dieter Borchardt “The ABC of European Union Law” available at 
http://europa.eu.documentation/legislation/pdf/oa8107147_en.pdf  at page 12  
50 Kapetyn & VerLoren op cit note 47 at 16 
51 O F Robinson, T D Fergus, W M Gordon, European Legal History, 3rd Edition, Butterworths London (2000) at 
310 
52 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 1957; The Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community, 1957 herein after referred to collectively as “the Treaties of Rome” 
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by far the most important of the three communities for purposes of achieving an economically 
integrated Europe.53  
Like SADC, the ECSC established certain institutions designed to drive the work of the 
organization. Article 7 of the Treaty of Paris sets out the institutions to be established in order for 
the instrument to meet its aims and objectives, those institutions being the High Authority, the 
Common Assembly, the Special Council composed of ministers of the member states and finally 
the Court of Justice. The EC and Euratom in their incorporation would follow a similar 
institutional pattern in terms of the structures created to help them meet their objectives. In that 
regard no doubt it was from this structure that SADC sought to borrow from when creating its 
own legal edifice. 
The EC and Euratom both had a Commission and a Council of Ministers however they 
„piggybacked‟ on the ECSC‟s institutions insofar as the Court of Justice as well as the European 
Parliament (previously known as “the Assembly”) were concerned. Therefore the Court of 
Justice and the European Parliament, created under the Treaty of Paris, were to serve all three 
communities. 
However, the time soon came for the need to rationalise and harmonise the Communities and in 
1965 the member states concluded the Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single 
Commission of the European Communities54 which came into force in 1967. The effect of the 
Merger Treaty was to merge the High Authority of the ECSC and the Commissions of the EC 
and Euratom into one body being the European Commission55. Furthermore, the Merger Treaty 
provided that the Communities were to be served by one council of ministers being the Council 
of the European Communities56, the effect of this being that the Communities now all shared the 
same institutions. The aforementioned amounting to possibly the first real step towards the path 
to achieving a politically unified Europe as had been intimated at the 1956 meeting in Venice. 
                                                          
53Robinson Fergus & Gordon op cit note 51 at 310  
54 Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, 1965 herein after 
referred to as the “Merger Treaty” 
55 Article 9 supra note 54 
56 Article 1 supra note 54 
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The creation of the European Union by means of the 1 Treaty on European Union 57, marked a 
further step along the path to the political unification of Europe.58 The Maastricht Treaty 
established the European Union, although it did not finish the job as the EC was not integrated 
into the European Union and thus still had its own separate legal personality. Complete 
unification was done by way of the Treaty of Lisbon59 which merged the European Union and 
the EC into a single organization. Accordingly, the European Union replaced and succeeded the 
EC60 however the Treaties of Rome would remain in force as a source of law. 
For purposes of this chapter, I have chosen to examine the legal edifice of the EC because the 
ECSC and Euratom were subject specific communities whilst the EC enjoyed a far broader 
mandate insofar as its aims and objectives are concerned. 
This broader mandate tasked the EC with creating a common market to promote the harmonious 
development of economic activities61 and is similar to the target of SADC which looks to create 
a common market, eventually leading to a monetary union, with the hope of stimulating 
economic growth.62  When gleaning over both the EC and SADC treaties aims/objectives it is 
clear that both instruments have recognised the need for a focus on development in achieving 
their goals thus making this a suitable instrument to contrast SADC against. 
EC: Legal Order 
The two treaties establishing the EC and Euratom were both signed in Rome on 25 March 1957, 
as a result of this sequence of events the treaties have come to be known cumulatively as “the 
Treaties of Rome”. This chapter shall focus solely on one of them, namely the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community.63 
Article 1 of the EC Treaty established the EC with its purpose apparent from the first recital in 
the preamble which records that the parties are determined to lay the foundations of a closer 
                                                          
57 Treaty on European Union, 1993,  herein after referred to as the “Maastricht Treaty” 
58 Borchardt op cit note 49 at 12 
59 Treaty of Lisbon, 2007 
60 Borchardt op cit note 49 at 13 
61 Article 2 supra note 52 
62 Article 5(1)(a) supra note 4 
63 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 1957 as amended by the Maastricht Treaty herein after 
referred to as the “EC Treaty” 
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union among the peoples of Europe.64 The aforementioned is an indication that the concept of a 
united Europe i.e. fully integrated, has always been one of the underlying objectives in the 
formation of the EC, naturally the EC would later serve as one of the cornerstones of the 
European Union. Interestingly a similar objective can be gleaned from article 5(1)(d) of the 
SADC Treaty, which provides that the objective of SADC is to “consolidate” the historical ties 
of the peoples of the region. 
The objective of the EC is set out in Article 265, which tasks the EC with establishing a common 
market as well as an economic and monetary union; the promotion throughout the EC of a 
harmonious development of economic activities, as well as closer relations between the member 
states belonging to the EC. In line with underlying objective set out in the preamble being that of 
European integration. 
Interestingly the abovementioned linear approach to market integration, developed decades ago, 
is the basis upon which SADC decades later has chosen to attempt to achieve market integration. 
The striking feature of this being how the prevailing economic conditions in 1950‟s Europe and 
21st century Africa are far from similar with one another. 
Article 3 of the EC Treaty sets out the activities to be undertaken by the EC in order to meet its 
objectives, the most important of which including the following: 
1. “the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and quantitative 
restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all other measures having 
equivalent effect; 
2. a common commercial policy; 
3. an internal market characterized by the abolition, as between Member States, of 
obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital; 
…” 
These activities falling squarely within the ambit of Viner‟s (1950) classical model of market 
integration. Therefore by implication SADC has chosen to replicate an integration model 
developed fifty years ago when the world was a far different place. 
                                                          
64 A H Robertson  European Institutions: Co-Operation :Integration: Unification  3 ed Stevens & Sons Limited 
(London), Matthew Bender (New York) 1973 at 174 
65 Supra note 63 
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Article 466 establishes 5 institutions tasked with implementation of the activities set out in Article 
367, those institutions being the Assembly (European Parliament); the Council; the Commission, 
the Court of Justice (discussed in chapter 3) and the Court of Auditors. However, due to the 
integration of the EC and the European Union, its original structure amalgamated with that of the 
European Union and was increased to seven institutions by article 1368 namely: 
1) The European Parliament. 
2) The European Council. 
3) The Council. 
4) The European (“the Commission”). 
5) The Court of Justice. 
6) The European Central Bank. 
7) The Court of Auditors. 
As set out from above, SADC‟s institutional structure is very much aligned to that of its 
European cousin. 
The European Council and the Council 
The European Council defines the general political direction and priorities of the European 
Union69, in the same vain as the role played by the Summit in SADC. The European Council, 
whilst not exercising legislative functions, is a vital element of the European Union. The 
European Council consists of the Heads of Sate of member states of the European Union.70 
The Council on the other hand was established in terms of Article 1 of the Merger Treaty and 
replaced the Special Council of Ministers of the European Coal and Steel Community, the 
Council of the European Economic Community and the Council of the European Atomic Energy 
established in terms of the Treaty of Paris and the Treaties of Rome respectively. 
The Council jointly with the European Parliament is the legislative arm of the EU. The 
aforementioned institutions also jointly exercise budgetary functions. The Council has the task of 
                                                          
66 Supra note 63 
67 Ibid 
68 Supra note 57 
69 Article 15(1) Supra note 57 
70 Article 15(2) Supra note 57 
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taking the final decision on, and carrying out, the proposals submitted to it by the Commission as 
well as acting on decisions taken by the European Council71. The Council shall consist of 
representatives of each member state at ministerial level.72 As can be seen from the tasks 
assigned to it, the SADC Ministerial Council and the Council do not just share the same name 
but also almost identical functions in their duties as well as their compositions. 
The European Parliament 
The European Parliament was originally called “the Assembly” but was renamed to the 
European Parliament” by the Single European Act.73 The members of the European Parliament 
are representatives of the people and the body represents the peoples of the European Union 
collectively and independently74. Members are elected via direct universal suffrage75 and as 
representatives of the people of Europe, members are not bound by the instructions of their 
governments, or of the national parliaments.76 The European Parliament exercises a legislative 
and supervisory role insofar as passing EU laws, together with the Council whilst also providing 
democratic scrutiny to all EU institutions77. 
The Commission 
Generally speaking it may be said that the Commission is an organ which is executive in 
character78  as it carries out the European Union‟s decisions and policies. The Commission also 
proposes legislation and is often instrumental in shaping the decision making of the Council. The 
main responsibilities of the Commission consist of promoting the general interest of the 
European Union, ensuring the application of the European treaties i.e. the EC Treaty and to 
oversee their application under the control of the Court of Justice, as well as to exercise 
executive management functions.79 
                                                          
71 M Horspool & M Humphreys European Union Law 6 ed, core text series Oxford University Press (2010) at 43 
72 Article 16(2) Supra note 57 
73 Title 2 of the Single European Act – “Provisions amending the Treaties” 
establishing the European Communities 
74 Kapetyn & VerLoren op cit note 47 at 209 
75 Article 14(3) supra note 57 
76 Ibid 
77
 EU institutions and Bodies available at http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/  
78 A H Robertson, European Institutions: Co-Operation: Integration: Unification, 3rd Edition, Stevens & Sons 
Limited (London), Matthew Bender (New York) 1973 at 183 
79Horspool and Humphreys op cit note 71 at 56 
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The commission is intended to give expression to the European Union‟s interests with its most 
important activity being formulating proposals for new policies concerning the EU, mediating 
between member states to secure the adoption of these proposals, coordinating national policies 
and overseeing the execution of existing policies.80 Members of the Commission shall in the 
general interest of the Communities be independent in the performance of their duties, thus 
taking no instructions or mandates from the national governments.81 The aforementioned does 
not prevent governments or interest groups from lobbying commissioners. 
In conclusion, it is clear that the key drivers of the EC/EU are the institutions, charged with the 
overseeing of the objectives as well as the manner of attending to meeting those objectives. As 
demonstrated, this is largely the same model adopted by SADC in establishing itself as regional 
body. The institutions of SADC resemble those of the European Union in their structure as well 
as in their functioning, variances existing mainly as a result of SADC having yet to reach 
monetary union stage in its progression towards market integration as well as due to the fact that 
SADC is a regional body as opposed to a continental one. 
 
III The Court of Justice vis a vis the Tribunal: Comparative Analysis 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the focus of this chapter shall be a comparative analysis of the 
European Union and SADC insofar as the operation of the Court of Justice and the Tribunal are 
concerned. The focus in this regard being on the application and enforcement of judgements by 
the respective instruments in their respective member states. Highlighting how the Tribunal 
super imposed the characteristics of its EU counterparts except insofar as the enforcement 
mechanism of judgments was concerned, perhaps pointing to a distrust of the Tribunal by the 
Member States. 
The Judicial system of the European Union was, until the enactment of the Treaty of Nice82 
which amended various provisions of the Maastricht Treaty as well as the Treaties Establishing 
the Communities, a two tier judicial system.83 This comprised of the Court of Justice, initially 
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established by the Treaty of Paris, as well as the General Court initially established to relieve the 
growing case load of the Court of Justice84. The aforementioned two tier system is also assisted 
by „specialised courts‟ established in terms of the Treaty of Nice which can be regarded as the 
third and final tier of the European Union‟s legal edifice.85 
The fundamental task of the abovementioned institutions is in terms of article 19(1) of the 
Maastricht Treaty to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties86, the law of 
the European Union, is observed.87 The Court of justice is the main court of the European 
Union88 as was envisioned over fifty years ago by the Treaty of Paris and the Treaties of Rome. 
The court shall consist of one judge from each member state89, and is assisted by officials termed 
“Advocate Generals”. There are eight Advocate Generals90 tasked with delivering reasoned 
opinions on cases brought before the court91 , an important task particularly as their impartial 
submissions on law and fact form an extremely valuable basis upon which the court can arrive at 
its judgements.92 
Insofar as the composition and structure of the Court of Justice is concerned the judges and 
Advocate Generals are appointed for six years93, in terms of article 19(2) of the Maastricht 
Treaty read with articles 252 and 253 of the TFEU. Individuals chosen to serve as judges and 
Advocate Generals must be persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the 
qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their own countries of 
origin or alternatively are legal experts of recognised competence94. 
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Insofar as the appointment of judges is concerned, appointment is done by way of common 
accord of the governments of the member states95 after consultation with a panel96 composed of 
former members of the Court of Justice, General Court members of national supreme courts and 
lawyers of recognised competence. The panel is established to give opinions on candidates 
suitability to perform the duties required97. 
Duties and Powers of the Court of Justice 
The powers of the Court of Justice can be divided into three categories98 namely settling disputes 
by handing down rulings99, giving preliminary rulings100 and ruling in other cases provided for 
under the Treaties.101 The last category representing a sort of catch all function. The jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice, insofar as the matters the court may hear, extends to all law of the 
European Union in accordance with article 19 of the Maastricht Treaty. 
The Court of Justice has two forms of jurisdiction, namely, plenary jurisdiction and preliminary 
rulings.102 The court has plenary jurisdiction in respect of the following: 
1. Infringement actions concerning actions brought by the Commission against member 
states.103  
2. Actions brought by member states against fellow member states.104 
3. Actions brought by the Commission against member states for non-compliance with court 
rulings.105 
4. Actions in respect of compensation for damages.106 
5. Actions to hold the European Union contractually liable.107  
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The aforementioned actions are not the only actions which can be heard by the court as it should 
be remembered that the Court of Justice acts as a court of first instances in certain matters within 
its jurisdictional competence whilst other matters fall within the courts jurisdiction only when 
brought on appeal from the General Court108. 
Insofar as the types of persons that can bring actions before the Court of Justice as well as the 
General Court, no right of individual access exists with article 40109 providing for minor 
exceptions. In terms of article 40 of the TFEU, member states, bodies, offices and agencies of the 
European Union and any other person who can establish an interest in the result may intervene in 
matters pending before the Court of Justice, furthermore whereby an independent party 
(natural/legal persons) is able to establish that it has a substantial interest in the result of the 
matter pending before the Court of Justice, the aforementioned party shall be  entitled to 
intervene in the matter subject to the proviso that private individuals may not intervene in 
matters pertaining to disputes between member states, member states and the community‟s 
institutions as well as between the community‟s institutions themselves. 
Insofar as preliminary rulings are concerned, article 267 of the TFEU provides that the court can 
give preliminary rulings on the following: 
1. Interpretation of the Treaties. 
2. Validity of acts and interpretations of the institutions. 
3. Preliminary rulings on points of EU law.110 
The court also has the power to award interim measures in direct actions, including infringement 
proceedings, in terms of articles 278 and 279 of the TFEU.111 The court is also vested with the 
following miscellaneous powers: 
1. Imposing penalties in respect of regulations adopted jointly by the European Parliament 
and the Council. 
2. Disputes involving the European investment bank, on arbitration clauses contained in 
contracts concluded by the community, disputes submitted under special agreements as 
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well as when asked to render an opinion in respect of international agreements with third 
countries or international organisations.112 
Duties and Powers of the General Court 
The General Court similar to the Court of Justice contains one judge per member state, and 
according to article 48 of the Statute of the Court of Justice113 shall have twenty seven judges. 
No doubt this is still to be amended to reflect the European Union‟s increased membership which 
currently stands at twenty eight members. The General Court was originally created in 1989 to 
alleviate the workload of the Court of Justice. The method of appointment of judges to the 




The General Courts task is to hear and determine the following matters at a first instance, 
namely: 
1. In terms of article 256 of the TFEU, direct actions concerning the legality of acts by the 
institutions of the European Union. 
2. The failure of an institution to act can be brought before the General Court.114 
3. Actions and failures to act with respect to compensation for damages.115 
4. Actions in respect of disputes between the European Union and staff members.116  
5. Arbitration clauses except for those assigned to specialised courts.117 
The General Court also has jurisdiction with regards to direct actions for annulments and for 
failure to act brought by the member states against: 
1. “decisions of the Council concerning state aid; 
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2. Acts of the Council adopted pursuant to a Council regulation concerning measures to protect trade; 
3. Acts of the Council by which it directly exercises implementing powers; 
4. Acts of the European Central Bank and acts of the Commission with the exception of those which concern 
enhanced cooperation”118 
The Tribunal 
The Tribunal is one of six organs established under article 9 of the SADC Treaty. The Protocol 
granted the Tribunal exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of the SADC 
Treaty, the interpretation, application, or validity of SADC law and acts of SADC organs, as well 
as any other mandate specific matter.119   
The Tribunal was constituted in terms of Article 16 of the SADC Treaty and was to function in 
accordance with the provisions of the SADC Treaty and the Protocol.120 Much like the Court of 
Justice and the General Court, the Tribunal was to consist of not less than 10 judges, appointed 
from nationals of Member States who possessed the requisite qualifications required for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective Member States or who were jurists 
of recognised competence.121 In the same vain as the Court of Justice, each Member State was 
entitled to nominate one candidate having the necessary qualifications. 
Furthermore, of the ten judges appointed to the Tribunal, the Council was required to designate 
five of the judges to sit regularly on the Tribunal.122 The additional judges constituting a pool 
from which the President would be entitled to invite a judge to sit on the Tribunal whenever a 
regular judge was temporarily absent or was otherwise unable to carry out their functions.123 No 
two or more judges were allowed to be nationals of the same Member State.124 
Judges were be selected by the Council from a list of candidates so nominated by Member 
States125, with the judges being appointed by the Summit on the recommendation of the 
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Council126, for a term of five years. The selection of judges a unique feature to the Tribunal as it 
allowed Member States a greater level of control in appointing judges as opposed to that found in 
the Court of Justice and General Court which appoints judges on the recommendation of a panel 
established in terms of article 255 of the TFEU. 
Article 15 of the Protocol set out the scope of jurisdiction of the Tribunal, which included 
disputes between Member States, as well as between natural or legal persons and Member 
States.127 It is important to note that no natural or legal person was entitled to bring an action 
against a Member State unless they had exhausted all available remedies or were unable to 
proceed under their domestic jurisdiction128. This demonstrates a divergence between the 
Tribunal and its European cousins, as where the Tribunal granted locus standi to private 
individuals the same was not the case in Europe. 
The Tribunal also had jurisdiction to act as an appellate court in cases whereby a party to a 
matter wished to appeal any dispute relating to the legal findings and conclusions of a panel 
established under a protocol.129  Appeals being limited to issues of law and legal interpretation. 
This is similar to the powers and duties bestowed upon the Court of Justice which is a court of 
first instance on certain matters but is endowed with appellate jurisdiction insofar as matters 
from the General Court are concerned. 
Similar to its EU counter parts, the Tribunal was empowered with the ability of providing 
preliminary rulings130 as well as advisory opinions131, on the application and/or interpretation of 
the SADC Treaty, the protocols and all other instruments adopted by SADC‟s institutions or 
bodies.132 However, in terms of article 21(b) of the SADC Treaty, the Tribunal was also 
expressly entitled to develop its own jurisprudence having regard to the principles of public 
international law. 
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Another similar characteristic found between the Tribunal and the Court of Justice as well as the 
General Court is the power to make award the interim rulings i.e. interim measures.133 The 
relatively wide nature of the term “interim measures” envisioned under the Court of Justice are 
also adopted by the Tribunal insofar as it is empowered to order the suspension of acts 
challenged before the Tribunal as well as to take “other interim measures as necessary”134 
similar to the Court of Justice.135 
Enforcement of Judgements 
For purposes of the European Union, if a member state fails to comply with a judgement, 
infringement proceedings may be brought against the member state by the Commission before 
the Court of Justice136 in terms of article 260.137 By the end of 1994 the Court of Justice had 
found against member states on 23 separate occasions, thus the burden of ensuring that 
judgements of the Court of Justice are complied with seems to fall mainly on the Commission, 
which in most cases succeeds in persuading member states to comply with court proceedings.138 
Article 260(2) TFEU, formerly article 228(2) of the EC Treaty, provides for the possibility of the 
Court of Justice imposing a financial penalty on the offending member state if it fails to comply 
with a judgement.139 This step can be as the ultimate stage in persuading member states to 
comply and therefore relatively rare.140 The Treaty of Lisbon has sped up the system of 
pecuniary sanctions and also enables the Court of Justice to impose pecuniary sanctions, once the 
initial judgement establishing a failure to fulfil obligations has been given, in the event of a 
failure to notify national measures implementing a directive to the commission.141 
Article 32 of the Protocol regulates the enforcement and execution of judgements by the Member 
States. The law and rules of civil procedure for the registration and enforcement of foreign 
judgements in force in the territory of the Member State in which the judgement were to be 
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enforced governed enforcement.142 Member States were required to take all steps necessary to 
ensure the enforcement of decisions of the Tribunal, with decisions being binding on all Member 
States party to the dispute and enforceable within the territories of those Member States. Any 
failure by a Member State to comply with a decision of the Tribunal was to be referred to the 
Tribunal, which if the Tribunal established the existence of such failure, would report its finding 
to the Summit for the latter to take appropriate action.143 
With the abovementioned in mind, the mechanisms available to Member States in the 
enforcement of judgments under SADC showcased a completely different approach to that found 
in the European Union. Whereas whilst in the European Union the remedies available to member 
states whereby a party failed to adhere to a judgment are clear and precise, including recourse to 
financial penalties. The same was not true for SADC which provided for no financial penalty nor 
any concrete form of sanction as the ultimate decision lay at the hands of the highly politicised 
Summit, a weakness of the Tribunals enforcement mechanism. 
When looking at the powers, duties, functions and structure of the Tribunal vis a vis the Court of 
Justice as well as the General Court, it is clear that there are a large number of common features. 
Synergies shared between the institutions insofar as the Tribunal was concerned, the drafters of 
the Protocol borrowed heavily from the European Union model. This is exhibited even in the 
manner in which judges were appointed, however an interesting divergence between the 
institutions was evident in the enforcement of judgments mechanism. What is of interest is that 
insofar as the enforcement of judgments is concerned arguably where the much maligned 
Eurocentric approach should have been adopted hook , line and sinker as seen with other 
provisions of the Protocol this was not done. Instead a rather weak enforcement mechanism was 
adopted, this perhaps showing an early distrust or unwillingness to be bound to the Tribunals 
rulings by Member States. 
In conclusion, it is striking that in adopting such a weak enforcement mechanism, SADC 
conveniently paid little attention to the fact that as a result of the repressive nature of certain 
African regimes, the continent has become notorious for not always abiding by court judgments 
making such an enforcement mechanism all the more peculiar. 
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IV Comparative Analysis of the Protocol v the New Protocol 
The focus of this chapter shall be to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the New Protocol 
versus that of the Protocol, by way of conducting a comparative analysis between both legal 
texts. The purpose of this is to ascertain whether or not any lessons were learnt by SADC 
following the disbandment of the Tribunal. Specifically, whether or not those lessons have been 
applied in a manner meant to benefit the people of sub Saharan Africa or whether to merely 
benefit the narrow interests of the Summit. 
The Tribunal, established in terms of Article 16(1) and (2) of the SADC treaty, became 
operational in November 2005. Its establishment initially seemingly signaling the beginning of a 
new era in which Southern African States were seemingly willing to accept a limitation to their 
hard fought right to self-determination through international judicial supervision.144 
However, the euphoria surrounding the Tribunals establishment was short lived. The work of the 
Tribunal was suspended in August 2010, when the Summit ordered a review on the role, function 
and terms of reference of the Tribunal145 merely 5 years after its becoming fully operational. The 
suspension of the Tribunal and its subsequent disbanding emanating from the political fall out 
brought about by the Campbell Case. 
Following the fall out from the decision to suspend the Tribunal, the Council, acting upon its 
mandate from the Summit to amend the Protocol, began the process of amending the Protocol.146 
On 18 August 2012 the Summit, suspended the work of the Tribunal indefinitely and resolved 
that a New Protocol on the Tribunal should be negotiated and that its mandate should be 
confined solely to inter-State disputes.147 
In August 2014, at a meeting of the Summit, the Member States paved the way for the revival of 
the Tribunal by the adoption of the New Protocol in respect of the Tribunal. Currently nine heads 
of state have signed the New Protocol however none have ratified same in their own countries. 
The haste with which the heads of state have attended to sign the New Protocol is rather 
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worrisome, as the New Protocol in its current format leaves the organ as nothing more than 
another paper tiger with good intentions. 
The discussion to follow shall not be a line by line comparative analysis over both the new and 
old protocols as many changes which can be found in the New Protocol as compared to the 
Protocol are largely cosmetic changes. For instance, the word “Member”148 which was used to 
denote “…members of the Tribunal…”149 has been changed to “Judge”150, which from a drafting 
point of view is a good start as the previous position led to confusion at certain portions of the 
text insofar as whether the term was with reference to judges of the Tribunal or Member States. 
The focus of the discussion will thus purely revolve around those portions I believe to be the 
salient amendments and the effects they may have going forward. The first salient difference 
between the Protocol and the New Protocol can be found with regards to the selection and 
appointment of judges regulated under article 4 of the New Protocol151. Previously judges were 
to be appointed to the Tribunal by the Summit upon having received recommendations from the 
Council.152 However, under the New Protocol, Judges are to be appointed by the Summit upon 
recommendation of the Council in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Summit from time 
to time.153 The appointment of Judges, previously made no mention of “guidelines adopted by 
the Summit from time to time”. 
The additional wording seems to be an attempt by the drafters to water down the powers 
previously granted to the Council by the Protocol, reason being, in terms of South African 
constitutional law the term “upon recommendation of” binds the authority to whom which 
recommendations have been made, to have to uphold those recommendations. 
Thus the additional wording, instead of binding the Summit to appoint a candidate recommended 
by the Council,  the Summit are now empowered with the authority to set guidelines as to the 
type of candidate they are looking to appoint. Granting the Summit a measure of extra control 
over the Council in respect of the types of judges the Summit want to sit on the Tribunal and thus 
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the type of judges the Council should propose, which was not previously envisioned under the 
Protocol. No doubt this extra control in the form of guidelines is a response to the Campbell case 
insofar as the Tribunal was often criticised for its apparent overreach into Zimbabwe‟s policy 
space and domestic affairs.154 One cannot help but feel that the additional wording has left space 
for the politicisation of the appointment of judges, insofar as allowing the Summit to rubber 
stamp only those judges with a track record of being somewhat pro government. 
As is customary in the legal profession, prior to taking judicial office, judges are required to take 
an oath to affirm their willingness to carry out their duties diligently and to the best of their 
abilities. The aforementioned declaration155 speaks to the next point of divergence between the 
Protocol and the New Protocol. Under Article 5156 all judges were required to make a solemn 
declaration that they would carry out their duties independently, impartially and conscientiously. 
In terms of the New Protocol157 all judges are still required to make a solemn declaration, what is 
noteworthy is the inclusion of the following wording “reserve the confidentiality of the Tribunals 
deliberations”. 
The abovementioned wording was not in the previous article dealing with the solemn 
declaration, as this principal is trite in law in most jurisdictions. Perhaps the additional wording 
is a response by the drafters to the fierce criticism leveled at the Council as well as the Summit 
by the previous judges of the Tribunal upon its disbandment. The Judges going as far as to 
charge that the disbandment was ultra vires and done in bad faith158 criticism leveled at the 
Summit being no more scathing than that of Justice Pillay who described the Member States 
decision to constitute the Tribunal as nothing more than a mere gambit to illicit funds from the 
European Union and other international donors.159 
It should be noted that Article 13 of the New Protocol states that Judges shall be immune from 
prosecution for anything said or done by them in their judicial capacity. This exemption from 
prosecution although well intentioned, is rather wide and may need to be harmonized with article 
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6.160 The intentional inclusion of the confidentiality requirement in the solemn declaration could, 
on an interpretation of the Protocol, render the confidentiality requirement meaningless as article 
13 acts as a catch all. 
Article 12 of the New Protocol deals with the disqualification or recusal of judges of the 
Tribunal, previously regulated under article 9 of the Protocol. Article 12(4) of the New Protocol 
fully develops the notion of a “conflict of interests” which had not been done previously. Article 
12(4) states: 
 “Conflict of interest include without limitation, the possession by a judge, or a close family 
member of a judge or associate of a judge, of any financial and property interests relevant to the 
dispute, and the affiliations or employment of a close family member of a judge or associate of a 
judge on interests relevant to the dispute”. 
Although this is a fairly trivial article and one which is far from controversial, it should be noted 
that it is unlikely any of the scenario‟s covered in the carve out of “conflict of interests” will ever 
play themselves out as the possibility has been removed with the scaling down of the scope of 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal vis a vis to only state versus state disputes and thus may not be 
appropriate for the text. 
Jurisdiction in terms of the New Protocol is now dealt with under Articles 33 as opposed to 
Article 14 and 15 of the Protocol. Article 33 states “the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction on the 
interpretation of the SADC Treaty and the Protocols relating to disputes between Member 
States”. Whereas Article 14 and 15 state, respectively – 
“The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over all disputes and all applications referred to it 
in accordance with the Treaty and this Protocol which relate to: 
a)     the interpretation and application of the Treaty; 
b)  the interpretation, application or validity of the Protocols, all subsidiary 
instruments adopted within the framework of the Community, and acts of 
the institutions of the Community; 
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c)  all matters specifically provided for in any other agreements that Member 
States may conclude among themselves or within the community and 
which confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal. 
Article 15: 
1. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over disputes between States, and between 
natural or legal persons and states; 
2. No natural or legal person shall bring an action against a state unless he or she 
has exhausted all available remedies or is unable to proceed under domestic 
jurisdiction 
3. Where a dispute is referred to the Tribunal by any party the consent of the other 
parties to the dispute shall not be required. 
The following can be noted from the abovementioned, the scope of jurisdiction has been 
diminished rather drastically, whereas previously the Tribunal had jurisdiction in disputes 
between Member States and the community, interstate disputes as well as disputes between 
natural or legal persons and Member States. However the New Protocol in its current form now 
only provides for the Tribunal to have the jurisdiction to hear matters pertaining to disputes 
involving Member States only, thus removing the locus standi of natural persons to be heard 
before the Tribunal. 
The removal of the Tribunals locus standi to hear natural persons is regrettable as individual 
complaints for SADC  law violations by member states have to date been the defining feature of 
the Tribunal.161 In the last few years individual complaints have set outstanding precedents for 
the emergence of African regional jurisprudence.162 Although with this in mind, the potential 
loss of locus standi could be offset by the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights. The 
aforementioned promises to become a unique continent wide jurisdiction for intrinsic human 
rights cases, independent from the overlapping sub regional integration schemes.163 
                                                          






From a strictly academic point of view, the concern about the abolishment of individual access is 
that since the Tribunal‟s contribution to regional integration and to the respect of community law 
has so far been its jurisprudence on individual complaints. The question is how to obtain judicial 
stimulation and control of SADC through deliberating over other disputes such as interstate 
disputes, bearing in mind however that up until this day none have been brought to the Tribunal 
for deliberation.164 
Academic scholar Lukas Knott argues that the Court of Justice can serve as an example to SADC 
as it exemplifies a court that although having never provided for individual complaints against 
member state, has still been effective. The Court of Justice, he argues, has had an immense 
impact on a large array of individual rights and the respective domestic court procedures through 
the mechanism of preliminary rulings.165 He further argues that: 
“in the long term - assuming the success of the regional judiciary is a lasting one – it 
could even prove beneficial to exclude individual actions against community members 
from Tribunals jurisdiction. A single community court is hardly best placed for being 
direct addressee of all legal resources by community citizens implicating SADC and 
international law to some degree. It would be much more desirable to achieve a 
subsidiary application of community law by domestic, low-instance courts, with the 
SADC Tribunal only setting interpretive precedents for that purpose”166. 
Thus in light of the aforementioned, it is inferred that the removal of individual access is 
cushioned by the right to seek preliminary rulings.167 Unfortunately however the New Protocol 
has also removed the right to seek preliminary rulings168, this coupled with the removal of 
individual access renders the argument somewhat moot. 
Furthermore, although the idea of having subsidiary application of community law by domestic 
low instance courts is a good idea, it does not seem to take account of the fact that SADC already 
operates under a severely constrained budget even though eighty percent of its funding is 
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currently being sourced from foreign donors169. Thus to add lower instance courts may lead to a 
better functioning Tribunal and better jurisprudence, however weighed up against the financial 
implications may not be viable. 
From the argument advanced by Lukas Knott, it can also be said that perhaps the right of 
individual access to the Tribunal was inappropriate in the African context. As even in the 
European Union, individuals are precluded from intervening in matters pertaining to disputes 
between member states, member states and the community‟s institutions as well as between the 
community‟s institutions themselves.170 
In such instances if a private individual is of the opinion that his rights under EU law have not 
been respected by the national authorities of a member state, at EU level private individuals are 
only entitled to submit petitions to the European Parliament171 via the Committee on Petitions of 
the European Parliament. In order to have the European Parliament debate how EU law has been 
applied in that particular member state, how its application has been to the detriment of the party 
filing the petition and presumably whether the application of the law was correct or not.172 
Alternatively private individuals are entitled to contact the European Commission concerning the 
application of EU law to which the individual believes has been applied inconsistently or to their 
detriment.173 Lastly, persons are entitled to contact the European Ombudsman should they feel 
the Commission did not satisfactorily deal with their complaint.174 
The abovementioned demonstrating that individual access is the exception as opposed to the rule 
insofar as quasi-judicial bodies of this nature are concerned. With that in mind it would seem that 
indeed, the right to individual access was largely inappropriate and that although its abolishment 
is unfortunate, what is most unfortunate in the circumstances is that the right to seek preliminary 
rulings has been abolished. 
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It seems unlikely that the Member States intend on progressively adding to the scope of 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal via a form of linear progression towards eventually reaching 
individual access as was previously the case. Therefore a model emphasizing cooperation 
between national courts and the Tribunal would be ideal, whereby the Tribunal sets interpretive 
precedents to be applied at domestic level in line with the approach followed in the European 
Union. 
Another striking feature is the concerted effort by the drafters to limit the scope of the legal 
instruments that may be brought to the court for resolution. Previously the Tribunal was 
empowered to hear disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the SADC Treaty; 
interpretation, application or validity of the protocols, all subsidiary instruments adopted within 
the framework of the community, and acts of the institutions of the Community. Furthermore all 
matters specifically provided for in other agreements that states may conclude amongst 
themselves and which confer jurisdiction to the Tribunal.175 
However, the New Protocol reflects a new reality whereby the aforementioned has now been 
amended to reflect a Tribunal only empowered to hear disputes between states in respect of the 
SADC Treaty and its ensuing protocols only. Thus removing the ability of the Tribunal 
deliberating over agreements between states not part of the suite of protocols annexed to the 
SADC treaty. 
Therefore whereby previously members were entitled to conclude agreements outside the scope 
of the SADC Treaty and use the Tribunal as a mechanism of resolving any possible disputes that 
has now been removed as an option. Institutions created by the SADC Treaty and or protocols 
aside from the Tribunal have now also been excluded from being able to have locus standi before 
the Tribunal, thereby requiring all protocols to be redrafted to include dispute resolution 
mechanisms within those relevant protocols. 
Another aspect of the New Protocol which requires mention is the dispute resolution procedure 
set out under the article 49 of the New Protocol. Similar to the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
of the World Trade Organisation, the principle of amicable resolution of disputes between states 
as the first prize without going to litigation has been imported into the New Protocol whereas 
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previously it did not feature. Article 49(2) states that “any dispute arising from the application, 
interpretation, or implementation of this Protocol, which cannot be settled amicably, shall be 
referred to the SADC Tribunal”. 
Therefore, unlike previously whereby member states were entitled to immediately proceed with 
litigation before the Tribunal in cases of disputes arising, the position has now changed to one 
requiring that a Member State first attempt to amicably resolve the dispute prior to proceeding to 
the Tribunal. The only concern with this article is that it is very brief and does not set out any 
thresholds with regards to when a state can deem itself to have satisfied the requirement before 
proceeding to the Tribunal. Without setting thresholds parties could be locked in amicable 
discussions indefinitely. 
Finally, the New Protocol regulates the manner in which Member States may withdraw from the 
New Protocol. Article 50(1) states “A state may withdraw from this Protocol upon the expiration 
of twelve (12) months from the date of giving written notice to that effect to the Executive 
Secretary”. 
The New Protocol thus now establishes the right for states to withdraw from the protocol on the 
Tribunal at any moment of their choosing thus rendering the Tribunal somewhat redundant. 
Insofar as at what point can a Member State be held accountable when it is possible for Member 
States to withdraw from the New Protocol at any given point. The effect being that members can 
only be held accountable if they want to be held accountable, thus almost reverting back to the 
old GATT176 principle of positive consensus which was done away with by the World Trade 
Organisation. 
In conclusion, many have argued that the decision to redraft the Protocol would serve as the 
death knell in the Tribunals judicial coffin, it must however be kept in mind that SADC‟s judicial 
architecture, perhaps more so its functioning has always exhibited room for improvement. That 
being said, perhaps the removal of the right to individual access represents one of the weaknesses 
and area‟s of improvement SADC needed to work on. Removing the right could perhaps 
strengthen the functioning of the Tribunal. However only if the right to seek preliminary rulings 
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is reinstated and whereby mechanisms in Member States are put in place to enforce the SADC 
Treaty, though it is unlikely many will share this view. 
Numerous critics of the review and redrafting of the Protocol fear that the ratification of the New 
Protocol in its current form will lead to a paralysed and Impaired Tribunal, which is hard to 
dispute in light of Member States being able to withdraw from the New Protocol rather easily, 
amongst other things. Perhaps what is most disappointing is not the decision to suspend and 
redraft the Protocol, rather the fact that the New Protocol contains the same fatal flaw as those 
which were in the Protocol. 
The Council in conjunction with the Legal Sector and Secretariat in drafting the New Protocol 
should have sought to rectify the Tribunals biggest impediment, being the inability of the 
Tribunal to enforce its judgments in the territories of Member States. As this leaves enforcement 
in the hands of the Summit which, looking at the Campbell case, due to its political nature has 
showcased its unwillingness to take the necessary measures to force states to comply with the 
rulings of the Tribunal leaving the Tribunal as a toothless institution serving only the narrow 













V The Campbell Case 
Land rights in Zimbabwe have been a source of domestic controversy and regional concern since 
Zimbabwe‟s independence in 1980.177 The sheer controversy surrounding the topic would 
eventually spill over and fall squarely in the lap of the Tribunal, consequently the Tribunal was 
dissolved as a result. Thus the purpose of this chapter is to contextualize why land rights have 
been such a hot topic and how the debate landed at the footstep of the Tribunal only to eventually 
lead to the Tribunals disbandment. 
The pursuit of a policy of compulsory land redistribution in the late 1990‟s significantly 
contributed to the breakdown of the rule of law in Zimbabwe in the early 2000‟s.178 Subsequent 
to the failure of commercial methods to fairly redistribute land, compulsory purchase became the 
next option available. The Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000 removed the Zimbabwean 
government‟s obligation to pay full compensation for land acquired for purposes of 
redistribution. This allowed for the fast tracking of the resettlement phase designed to accelerate 
the process of land acquisition179 by the Government and resettling the people of Zimbabwe. 
The process of land acquisition and resettlement quickly deteriorated to a state of lawlessness as 
observed by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, as ex combatants of 
the liberation struggle began taking the law into their own hands and thus occupying farms 
illegally.180 The land redistribution policy of the government began being executed not only by 
the government but also by armed gangs simultaneously.181 Furthermore when the Zimbabwean 
Supreme Court ruled the government‟s actions to be unlawful, the Zimbabwean constitution was 
amended retrospectively in 2005 to end any future litigation which may stem from the land 
redistribution program.182 
The abovementioned situation formed the basis of the application made to the Tribunal in the 
Campbell Case183, in which the Tribunal had to deal with the validity of the governments land 
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reform program. On 11 October 2007 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited and William Michael 
Campbell184 filed an application with the Tribunal challenging the acquisition by the 
Zimbabwean government185  of agricultural land owned by them. Simultaneously, in terms of 
article 28 of the Protocol, they filed an application for an interim measure restraining the 
Zimbabwean government from removing them or allowing their removal from their land pending 
a determination on the legality of the matter by the Tribunal, which was granted by the Tribunal. 
Subsequently, seventy seven other persons applied to intervene in the proceedings and the cases 
were consolidated into one case. 
Regardless of the granting of the interim measures the Applicants were removed from their 
lands, on 20 June 2008 the Applicants referred the failure on the part of the Respondent to 
comply with the Tribunal‟s decision regarding the interim relief granted to the Tribunal. The 
Tribunal upon establishing the failure by the Respondent to abide by the interim orders granted 
in terms of article 28, referred the matter to the Summit pursuant to article 32(5) of the Protocol 
for enforcement action. The aforementioned failure by the Respondent in hindsight can be seen 
as the opening salvo fired by the Respondent in deligitimising the Tribunal which ultimately led 
to the Tribunals suspension and disbandment. 
Subsequent to referring the Respondent‟s matter to the Summit, the Summit in terms of article 
32(5)186 was tasked with taking appropriate actions in order to force Zimbabwe to honour its 
obligations under the SADC Treaty and the Protocol. However, the Summit failed to take any 
action with regards to the Respondents failure to prevent the Applicants removal from their land. 
In its deliberation on the compulsory acquisition of the Applicants agricultural land under the 
land reform program, the Tribunal began by noting that the acquisition of land in Zimbabwe had 
a long history but chose, for purposes of the case, to confine itself to the land acquisition carried 
out under section 16B of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No.17, 2005) 
(“Amendment 17”). The aforementioned thus restricting the Tribunals thought processes solely 
to the legality of the land redistribution program, which is unfortunate as due to the continents 
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colonial past, land redistribution is a matter which is bound to be contentious and thus should be 
viewed holistically in order to be able to arrive at lasting solutions. 
Amendment 17 to the Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe provides inter alia that 
agricultural land may be acquired by the government for purposes of resettlement in order to 
give effect to the government‟s land reform policy.187 Amendment 17 further determines that 
land acquired vests in the state and no compensation shall be payable to the owners except for 
any improvements effected on such land before it was acquired. Furthermore Amendment 17 
ousted the jurisdiction of the Zimbabwean courts to entertain any challenge concerning such 
acquisitions188 except insofar as the amount of compensation payable for any improvements 
effected on the land before it was acquired. 
In its application of Amendment 17, the Respondent acquired the agricultural land of mostly 
white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe, consequently the Applicants approached the Tribunal 
submitting as follows: 
“the Respondent acted in breach of its obligations under the Treaty by enacting and implementing 
Amendment 17; all the lands belonging to the Applicants which have been compulsory[Sic] 
acquired by the Respondent under Amendment 17 were unlawfully acquired since the Minister 
who carried out the compulsory acquisition failed to establish that he applied reasonable and 
objective criteria in order to satisfy himself that the lands to be acquired were reasonably 
necessary for resettlement purposes in conformity with the land reform programme; the 
Applicants were denied access to the courts to challenge the legality of the compulsory 
acquisition of their lands; the Applicants had suffered racial discrimination since they were the 
only ones whose lands have[Sic] been compulsory[Sic] acquired under Amendment 17, and the 
Applicants were denied compensation in respect of the lands compulsorily acquired from 
them”.189 
The Respondent in turn argued inter alia as follows: 
“the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the application under the Treaty; the 
premises upon which acquisition of lands was started was on a willing buyer willing 
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seller basis and that the land was to be purchased from white farmers who, by virtue of 
colonial history, were in possession of most of the land suitable for agricultural 
purposes; the Respondent continues to acquire land from mainly whites who own large 
tracts of land suitable for agricultural resettlement and this policy cannot be attributed to 
racism but to circumstances brought about by colonial history; the Respondent had also 
acquired land from some of the few black Zimbabweans who possessed large tracts of 
land; the Applicants will receive compensation under Amendment 17; the compulsory 
acquisition of lands belonging to Applicants by the Respondent in the context must be 
seen as a means of correcting colonially inherited land ownership inequities, and the 
Applicants have not been denied access to the courts. On the contrary, the Applicants 
could, if they wish to, seek judicial review”.190 
Against the abovementioned background, the Tribunal determined that the following issues 
required adjudication, namely: 
1. Whether or not the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain the application. 
2. Whether or not the Applicants have been denied access to the courts in Zimbabwe. 
3. Whether or not the Applicants have been discriminated against on the basis of race. 
4. Whether or not compensation is payable for the lands compulsorily acquired from the Applicants 
by the Respondent. 
Jurisdiction 
In deciding the question of the Tribunals jurisdiction, it is to be noted that upon the Applicants 
bringing the dispute to the Tribunal, they had first instituted proceedings in the Supreme Court of 
Zimbabwe with regards to the acquisition of their agricultural lands. In the Applicants bringing 
their application to the Tribunal, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe was still seized with the matter 
and had at the time of launching the application yet to give a ruling thus it came as no surprise 
that upon bringing the application to the Tribunal, the Respondent reacted by raising the issue as 
to whether or not the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to hear the matter as the Supreme Court of 
Zimbabwe had yet to deliver a judgement. Therefore the Respondent averring that the Applicants 
had yet to exhaust all available remedies as required by article 15(2) of the Protocol. 
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In deciding the issue, the Tribunal referred to Amendment 17 in terms of which the jurisdiction 
of the Zimbabwean Courts had been ousted insofar as the acquisition of agricultural land by the 
Respondent was concerned. The Applicants were thus in terms of Amendment 17 unable to 
institute proceedings in the courts of Zimbabwe insofar as the acquisition of agricultural land 
was concerned. This was later confirmed by the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe. In its ruling of 22 
February 2008 the Court stated that “by clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution, the 
Legislature, in the proper exercise of its powers, had lawfully ousted the jurisdiction of the 
courts of law from any of the cases in which a challenge to the acquisition of agricultural land 
may be sought”191, settling the question regarding the Applicant‟s duty to exhaust all available 
remedies. 
The Respondent also submitted that the SADC Treaty contains no standards as to which a 
Member States conduct can be judged and that in the absence of the same, such standards cannot 
be imported from other international documents. Furthermore that none of the protocols adopted 
under the SADC Treaty referred to agrarian reform and human rights, suggesting that in absence 
of same the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to rule on its land reform policy, an attempt to box the 
Tribunal into a corner insofar as only applying strict legal interpretations and not developing its 
jurisprudence. 
The Tribunal in dealing with the matter rejected the Respondent‟s arguments by referring to 
article 21(b) of the Protocol which empowers the Tribunal with the power to develop its own 
jurisprudence but also instructs the Tribunal to do so by also taking into account applicable 
treaties and general principles of public international law therefore settling the issue. The 
Tribunal also pointed out that in terms of jurisdiction, article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties prohibits the Respondent from invoking provisions of its national law 
(Amendment 17) as a justification for the failure to carry out international agreements.192 
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Access To Court & Right To Fair Hearing 
The second issue before the Tribunal was whether or not the Applicants had been denied access 
to the courts, furthermore whether they had been denied a fair hearing due to Amendment 17.193 
Member States are obliged to respect, promote and protect these two fundamental rights.194 The 
Tribunal based its reasoning on the viewpoint that the rule of law embraces these rights and 
article 4(c) of the SADC Treaty obliges Members to respect the principles of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law.195 The Tribunal stating that: 
“it is settled law that the concept of the rule of law embraces at least two fundamental 
rights, namely, the right of access to courts and the right to a fair hearing before an 
individual is deprived of a right, interest or legitimate expectation”.196 
The Tribunal accordingly attended to discussing the right to access to the courts via extensive 
reference to decisions of regional and national courts as well as quasi-judicial bodies.197 
In relation to the right to a fair hearing before an individual is deprived of a right, interest or 
legitimate expectation, the Tribunal held that it is a principle “well recognised and entrenched in 
law”.198 The Tribunal considered the relevant sections of Amendment 17 and held that the 
provisions of section 18(1) and (9) concerning the constitutional right to protection of law and a 
fair hearing have been taken away in relation to land acquired under section 16B(2)(a).199 The 
Tribunal cited the Supreme Court‟s explicit acknowledgement of this in its judgement.200  The 
Tribunal found in favour of the Applicants stating that the Respondents had breached article 4 of 
the SADC Treaty201. 
Racial Discrimination 
The other issue raised by the Applicants, if not the most pertinent issue raised in their application 
before the Tribunal, was that of racial discrimination. The Applicants contended that that the 
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land reform program was based on racial discrimination in that it targeted white Zimbabwean 
farmers only.202 The Applicants further argued that Amendment 17 was intended to facilitate or 
implement the land reform policy of the Respondent based on racial discrimination.203 The 
Applicants alleged that the Respondent, in the execution of the land reform program, did not take 
into account whether the land targeted was acquired during the colonial period or not. The 
Applicants therefore submitting that the policy although designed to redress the imbalances 
created during the colonial period, in effect directed that no person of white colour or European 
origin was to be allowed to retain ownership of a farm, although not specifically referring to 
race. 
The Respondent refuted the allegations made by the Applicant, arguing that not only white 
farmers were targeted but that the land reform program acquired farms suitable for agricultural 
purposes. Furthermore that such farms happened to largely be owned by white Zimbabweans 
which was inevitable due to Zimbabwe‟s colonial history. The Respondent also claimed that 
agricultural land of black farmers had also been acquired, moreover that certain white farmers 
had been issued with 99 year leases in respect of agricultural lands. 
The the question the council was seized with was whether or not Amendment 17 violated article 
6 of the SADC Treaty prohibiting discrimination. The Tribunal in setting about its tasks 
considered and noted various international and regional instruments prohibiting discrimination in 
all forms, going on to state that “the question is whether, in the absence of the explicit mention of 
the word „race‟ in Amendment 17, that would be the end of the matter”.204 
The Tribunal held that since the effects of the implementation of Amendment 17 were to be felt 
only by white Zimbabwean farmers, although Amendment 17 not explicitly referring to white 
farmers, its effect is only in respect of white farmers and consequently constitutes indirect 
discrimination or substantive discrimination.205 
The Tribunal went on further to state: 
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“In examining the effects of Amendment 17 on the applicants, it is clear to us that those effects 
have had an unjustifiable and disproportionate impact upon a group of individuals distinguished 
by race such as the Applicants. We consider that the differentiation of treatment meted out to the 
Applicants also constitutes discrimination as the criteria for such differentiation are not 
reasonable and objective but arbitrary and are based primarily on considerations of race. The 
aim of the Respondent in adopting and implementing a land reform programme might be 
legitimate if and when all lands under the programme were indeed distributed to poor, landless 
and other disadvantaged and marginalized individuals or groups”. 206 
The Tribunal concluded its ruling on racial discrimination stating: 
“if: (a) the criteria adopted by the Respondent in relation to the land reform programme had not 
been arbitrary but reasonable and objective; (b) fair compensation was paid in respect of the 
expropriated lands, and (c) the lands expropriated were indeed distributed to poor, landless and 
other disadvantaged and marginalized individuals or groups, rendering the purpose of the 
programme legitimate, the differential treatment afforded to the Applicants would not constitute 
racial discrimination”.207 
Compensation 
Lastly insofar as compensation is concerned, the Applicants argued that the Respondent 
breached its obligations under international law by failing to compensate them for the 
expropriated land.208 In a surprise twist, the Respondent did not dispute the entitlement of the 
Applicants to compensation but merely alleged that compensation was the duty of the former 
colonial power, Britain, based on the independence agreement concluded between Zimbabwe 
and Britain in 1978.209 
The Tribunal found that, in terms of section 16B(2)(b) which excluded payment of compensation 
for agricultural land acquired for resettlement purposes, in this regard the Tribunal found the 
applicants to have a right to compensation and the Respondent a  duty to pay fair compensation 
under international law.210 It was held that that the Respondent could not seek refuge under its 
national laws in order to avoid its international law obligation to pay compensation. The Tribunal 
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ordered the Respondent to take all necessary measures to ensure the Applicants ownership and 
possession of their lands was not disturbed pursuant to Amendment 17 and that those already 
evicted be paid fair compensation. However the Tribunal made no determination on damages but 
ordered Zimbabwe to comply with international law. 
As a general rule of thumb courts, in this case the Tribunal, should look to pass judgments and/or 
orders which are enforceable and are lasting as the right to access to court would be an illusion 
unless orders made by courts were capable of being enforced by those in whose favour such 
orders are granted.211 In this regard, the Tribunal in considering land redistribution in Zimbabwe 
with its contentious history should have sought to look at the issue holistically bearing in mind 
the history of colonialism and the displacements which took place as a result. The topic of land 
in Zimbabwe was at the time of the Campbell case and remains to this very day a matter which 
affects the boni mores, it can be argued that it is somewhat unreasonable to expect ordinary 
people to respect and abide by judgments on contentious issues when the rationale used is that of 
strict legal interpretation which does not open itself up to considerations regarding the history 
surrounding the issue, a governments‟ ability to enforce a judgment as well as the general boni 
mores. 
The Tribunal in rendering its judgement was required to examine the issue of racial 
discrimination as the Applicants had alleged that Amendment 17 targeted white people only, 
although the Respondents had contended that black farmers‟ land has also been acquired under 
Amendment 17. The Tribunal in its judgement was of the opinion that the effects of Amendment 
17 would be felt only by white farmers and that those effects had an unjustifiable and 
disproportionate impact on a group of individuals distinguished by race. The Tribunals decision 
in this regard is puzzling as the Respondent had argued that agricultural land had also been 
acquired from black farmers yet the Tribunal makes no mention of whether or not it took the 
aforementioned into consideration and furthermore what weight was assigned thereto. What is 
particularly puzzling is that due to agricultural land being acquired from both black and white 
farmers it seems to contradict the Tribunals finding that the effects will only be felt by white 
farmers. 
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The Tribunal whilst seized with the issue of possible racial discrimination legislated under 
Amendment 17 rightly sought to examine substance over form, insofar as looking at whether or 
not even though Amendment 17 did not explicitly refer to race. Rather whether its 
implementation would only affect white farmers. In carrying this examination out the Tribunal 
could‟ve and possibly should have looked at the history of the land issue in Zimbabwe and it 
would have seen why the issue had become so contentious and why it would mostly affect white 
farmers, however not exclusively white farmers. Specifically, the Tribunal should have referred 
to the Lancaster House Agreement.212 
The Lancaster House Agreement preserved the right to private property in the face of the burning 
issue of land redistribution at the time. However it also provided that Zimbabwe‟s former 
colonial authority, Britain, under the leadership of the government of Margaret Thatcher would 
provide the resources necessary to purchase the land for redistribution as the Lancaster House 
Agreement entrenched the willing buyer and willing seller principle.213 
With that agreed the land question was settled, however in 1997 with the fall of the Thatcher 
government and the arrival at 10 Downing Street of the Labour Party under the leadership of 
Tony Blair, Britain unilaterally reneged on its obligations under the Lancaster House 
Agreement.214 Minister of Overseas Development Clair Short informed the Zimbabwean 
government that the election of a new government “without links to former colonial interests”215 
meant that Britain no longer had “any special responsibility to meet the cost of land 
purchases”.216  
Therefore, a previously negotiated solution which „settled‟ a burning issue which plagued 
Zimbabwe prior to its independence, was cast wide open and thus irrevocably altering the 
countries political climate. With this in mind it is unlikely that the Lancaster House Agreement 
would have been signed with the property clause in its current form, furthermore that the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe which transposed the principles enshrined in the Lancaster House 
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Agreement regarding the right to private property would more than likely have been altered 
drastically. Thus the Tribunal should have taken this into consideration when applying its mind 
to the issues at hand. 
Furthermore, the Tribunal observed that it would have reached a different conclusion if the 
state‟s criteria in confiscating land had been reasonable and objective, if fair compensation had 
been paid for expropriated lands, and if these lands had been distributed to poor, landless and 
other disadvantaged individuals or groups217. However the observations made by the Tribunal 
are rather general and do not provide much guidance as to how a Member State could attempt to 
go about enacting a lawful land reform policy.  
First, insofar as “reasonable and objective criteria” are concerned it is interesting that the 
Applicant submitted various criteria that it thought should have been considered by the 
Respondent prior to acquiring the agricultural land. Criteria including whether the land targeted 
was acquired during the colonial period or not218, which seems to be a valid argument regarding 
criteria which should be taken into account. The Tribunal made no pronouncements in this 
regard which is unfortunate. 
Secondly, with regards to “fair compensation”, section 16B (2)(b) of Amendment 17 explicitly 
sets out that “no compensation shall be payable for land…except for any improvements effected 
on such land before it was acquired”. From the aforementioned one can gather that the 
Applicants although not being entitled to compensation for the land, were presumably entitled to 
compensation for built up structures on the land as it would likely constitute an improvement. 
The question then becomes whether or not the Applicants should be entitled to compensation for 
lands which were acquired under various colonial legislation including the Land Apportionment 
Act of 1930.219 The aforementioned formalized the acquisition of the countries best endowed 
land, by evicting the indigenous peoples who initially lived on it, assigning title to white farmers 
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of European descent.220 Resettling the indigenous peoples to inferior lands not suitable for 
farming. 
The patterns of land allocation under colonial rule were thus defined in terms of conquest221.  For 
instance, under the Land Apportionment Act , some fifty one per cent of land was reserved for 
white settlers (who numbered about fifty thousand), thirty per cent for African reserve areas (for 
about one million blacks), and the remainder for commercial companies and the colonial 
government.222 With this in mind and taking cognizance of the Tribunals observation of “fair 
compensation”, would it be fair for the government of Zimbabwe to pay compensation for land 
acquired by way of the conquest and eviction of the indigenous tribes who once occupied the 
land? Whilst always remaining cognisant of Zimbabwe‟s struggling economy and the reneging 
by the British government of its obligations to assist in the purchase of land for purposes of land. 
Lastly, insofar as to whether or not the lands were  distributed to poor, landless and other 
disadvantaged individuals or group, the Tribunal‟s approach in this regard is commendable as it 
seeks to hold the Respondent accountable to its people in land redistribution. The fact that the 
land redistribution policy was eventually corrupted through its application however does not 
invalidate the merits of the program in principle. 
Subsequent to their victory in the Campbell case, the Applicants approached the Zimbabwean 
courts to register the Tribunals decision, as required by article 32 of the Protocol the enforcement 
of foreign judgments being regulated by the common law in Zimbabwe. The order sought by the 
Applicants was heard by the High Court of Zimbabwe (“the High Court”) in the Gramara 
Case223, pursuant to the Tribunals decision on 28 November 2008. The High Court in delivering 
its judgement noted that with respect to article 32224 which states - 
1. the law and rules of civil procedure for the registration and enforcement of foreign 
judgements in force in the territory of the Member State in which the judgement is to be 
enforced shall govern enforcement. 
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2. Member States and institutions of the Community shall take forthwith all measures  necessary 
to ensure execution of decisions of the Tribunal. 
3. Decisions of the Tribunal shall be binding upon the parties to the dispute in respect of that 
particular case and enforceable within the territories of the Member States concerned. 
4. Any failure by a Member State to comply with a decision of the Tribunal may be referred to 
the Tribunal by any party concerned. 
5. If the Tribunal establishes the existence of such failure, it shall report its finding to the 
Summit for the latter to take appropriate action. 
The High Court observed that the overall effect of the abovementioned provisions is that the 
decisions of the Tribunal are binding and enforceable within the territories of Member States 
which are obliged to take all necessary measures for the execution of those decisions. However 
the domestic rules of procedure of each Member State govern the enforcement of a given 
judgment in the territory of that state.225 The High  Court further noted that it was common cause 
that Zimbabwe had not domesticated the SADC Treaty or the Protocol, nevertheless agreeing 
with the Applicant that a state cannot invoke its own domestic deficiencies in order to avoid or 
evade its international obligations or as a defense to its failure to comply with those obligations. 
The High Court however rejected the Applicants assertion that the primacy of treaty obligations 
at international law must be taken into account in applying domestic law at the municipal level, 
even where there‟s a clear conflict between the two regimes.226 
The High Court in determining the matter settled that the issues for determination were first, 
whether or not the Tribunal had the necessary jurisdictional competence to hear the matter and 
secondly whether the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to public policy. Insofar as 
the jurisdictional competency the court stated: 
“…all the Member States, including Zimbabwe, concluded and signed the Agreement 
Amending the Protocol on Tribunal on the 3rd of October 2002. By virtue of Articles 16 
and 19 of this Agreement, Articles 35 and 38 of the Protocol of the Tribunal, which 
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required ratification of the Protocol by two-thirds of the Member States, were repealed in 
total, thereby obviating the need to ratify the Protocol227”. 
Furthermore, “To conclude this aspect of the case…On the 14th of August 2001, the Amendment 
Agreement was signed by 13 out of the 14 Heads of State or Government of the Member States, 
including Zimbabwe, thereby concluding the process of its adoption and entry into force”. The 
High Court therefore ruling that the Tribunal was duly within its jurisdictional competencies to 
hear the matter. 
Lastly, with regards to the matter of public policy, the High Court noted that what constitutes 
public policy in any given country is a matter that eludes precise definition as the notion of 
public policy varies with time, place and circumstance in tandem with the changing social 
mores.228 The High Court went on to further say that for purposes of the present case it would be 
contrary to public policy for any state to violate its international obligations within its own 
domestic realm.229 The High Court stating that “every State party to a treaty in force is required 
to perform its obligations in good faith and, concomitantly, it cannot invoke its municipal law so 
as to absolve itself from its obligations at international law”.230 
The High Court upon citing various domestic case law noted that, customary international law 
forms part of the law of Zimbabwe except to the extent that it conflicts with a statute or judicial 
precedent231. Thus intimating that even though Zimbabwe was bound to the SADC Treaty in 
terms of international law as referred to above, it would be against Zimbabwean public policy 
not to recognise and enforce decisions of the Tribunal at municipal level unless the decision 
conflicts with a statute or judicial precedent. 
The High Court furthermore stated that, as a general rule by signing the SADC Treaty Zimbabwe 
created an enforceable legitimate expectation that it would adhere to the decisions of the 
Tribunal and would take steps to enforce those decisions in the domestic sphere as a matter of 
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public policy.232 However, the High Court went on to state that in its opinion the application of 
the general rule should be subject to a consideration of the facts on a case by case basis.233 
Finally, the High Court noted section 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe234 which reaffirms the 
constitution as the supreme law of the country and to the extent any other law is inconsistent 
with the constitution that law is void. The High Court then stated that: 
“The obvious implications of the supremacy of the Constitution are twofold. Firstly, to 
the extent that the common law is invoked to enforce a foreign judgment, the common law 
must be construed and applied so as to conform with the Constitution and any feature of 
the judgment that conflicts with the Constitution cannot, as a matter of public policy, be 
recognised or enforced in Zimbabwe. The notion of public policy cannot be deployed and 
insinuated under cover of the common law to circumvent or subvert the fundamental law 
of the land. Secondly, I consider it to be patently contrary to the public policy of any 
country, including Zimbabwe, to require its government to act in a manner that is 
manifestly incompatible with what is constitutionally ordained”. 
The High Court thus with this in mind also observed that the enforcement of the judgment would 
entail the eviction and upheaval of many of the beneficiaries of the land reform program whom 
the court noted also had a legitimate expectation that the government would implement the land 
reform program and fulfil their aspirations under it bearing in mind the history of the land 
question in Zimbabwe. The High Court thus found that the enforcement of the judgment would 
be contrary to public policy. 
In conclusion, in light of the above it is clear that the issue of land rights is a contentious matter, 
furthermore that the Tribunal in deliberating over the matter perhaps was not aware as to how 
delicate an issue it was in Zimbabwe, not to say that this would have influenced the Tribunals 
decision. However, when analyzing the impact the Tribunals decision was to have on Zimbabwe 
it is understandable why the Zimbabwean government chose to take issue with the Tribunals 
decision. It is submitted that the Tribunal did not pay enough attention to the matter of public 
policy when arriving at its conclusion, to which the High Court did. Public policy should have 
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been one of the considerations receiving attention by the Tribunal when adjudicating on the 
matter bearing in mind that as African judges they were acutely aware of the effects of 
colonialism on the continent. In failing to do so perhaps the Tribunal missed a great opportunity 





















VI The Conflict of Laws 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the conflict of laws which presented itself upon the 
Applicants attempt to have the Tribunals order enforced by the Zimbabwean High Court. The 
focus specifically being with regards to the debate between a nations public policy versus that of 
a foreign judgment. 
The idea of land redistribution regardless of the context is always likely to raise ire of certain 
members in society, none more so than those members of society from whom  land is being 
acquired for purposes of the redistribution. The outrage brought about by the loss of security of 
title is always going to be even more contentious when taking cognisance of the various 
competing interests between those benefitting from land redistribution and those affected by it, 
the proverbial debate between the “ haves” and the “have not‟s”. It should therefore have come 
as no great surprise that upon the Applicants in the Campbell Case attempting to enforce their 
landmark judgment from the Tribunal, insofar as having it domesticated and converted to an 
order of court, they would rub up against a great many challenges as witnessed in the Gramara 
Case. 
What was of great interest in the Gramara Case was how the debate regarding the interests of the 
“haves” i.e. the Applicants and “have not‟s” i.e. the beneficiaries of land redistribution, played 
themselves out in the High Court‟s judgment. Particularly with regards to the issue as to whether 
or not the recognition and enforcement of the Tribunal‟s decision would be contrary to public 
policy in Zimbabwe. The reason this is of interest is that the High Court decided upon the issue 
of the recognition and enforcement of the Tribunal‟s decision according to public policy, a 
concept with no concrete definition. 
The High Court in working through the various submissions made by both the Applicants and 
the Respondents and coming to a decision insofar as the issues requiring determination sought 
guidance from South African law regarding the enforcement of a foreign judgment. In South 
Africa, it is well established that foreign judgments are recognizable and enforceable under the 
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common law.235 The High Court looked at the general requirements for recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in South Africa, namely: 
“ (i) that the court which pronounced the judgment had jurisdiction to entertain the case 
according to the principles recognised by our law with reference to the jurisdiction of 
foreign courts (sometimes referred to as „international jurisdiction or competence‟) 
(ii) that the judgment is final and conclusive in its effect and has not become 
superannuated; 
(iii) that the recognition and enforcement of the judgment by our Courts would not be 
contrary to public policy; 
(iv) that the judgment was not obtained by fraudulent means; 
(v) that the judgment does not involve the enforcement of a penal or revenue law of the 
foreign State; and 
(vi) that enforcement of the judgment is not precluded by the provisions of the Protection 
of Businesses Act 99 of 1978, as amended”.236 
Upon working through the abovementioned requirements, the High Court accepted that, without 
having been directed by either counsel to Zimbabwean authorities stating the contrary, the 
common law of Zimbabwe was ad idem with the common law position of South Africa in this 
regard.237 In so doing therefore categorising the decisions of the Tribunal, a quasi-judicial body, 
as foreign judgments in the strict sense of the phrase i.e. judgments from other jurisdictions.  
From the abovementioned requirements the High Court extracted the issues of jurisdictional 
competence and public policy as those which required determination. 
The matter of public policy is a fascinating issue as the term “public policy” evades precise 
definition. This is as a result of the fact that the nature of public policy is not static, but varies 
from time to time238 and from place to place.239 Accordingly, attempting to define “public 
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policy”, a chameleon like concept is no easy task though many authors and academics have 
attempted to. 
For instance some would define public policy quite simply as what governments do and neglect 
to do, public policy therefore being the politics of resolving conflicts about resources, rights and 
morals.240 Woodrow Wilson, the father of the league of nations, defined public policy to be “the 
laws and regulations which are made by legislative statesmen and implemented by public 
administration personnel”241; Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan define public policy as “a 
projected program of goals” 242 and Lastly Thomas R. Dye was of the opinion that Public policy 
is “whatever governments choose to do or not to do”.243 
If we are to accept that public policy is not a static concept but rather one which varies in 
accordance to the times, a reasonable assertion, then the High Court‟s reasoning in treating the 
enforcement of foreign judgments as a matter requiring deliberation on a case by case basis is 
persuasive. This being as a result of the fact that at common law as part of the requirements of 
enforcing a foreign judgment is the inherent requirement that the judgment must not be contrary 
to public policy. Therefore, if public policy is an ever changing chameleon like concept, it would 
be inappropriate to presume to use a concrete approach when attempting to satisfy the 
requirement, as what was public policy in days gone by may not be public policy today. 
In light of the above, a question which begs answering is whether or not it was appropriate for 
the High Court to decide the matter on a concept with so little certainty as that of public policy. 
The discussion which takes place below should not be construed as a criticism of the use of 
public policy to decide the matter but rather an observation into how, although peculiar, the basis 
for such is sound in law. Furthermore that the Tribunal should also perhaps have paid greater 
attention to the role of public policy when coming to its decision as the High Court did so 
correctly in the circumstances. 
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In coming to its decision with regards to the recognition and enforcement of the Tribunals 
decision the High Court sought guidance from South African and English law. Having already 
established the South African position, it would not be amiss to consider how the aforementioned 
is dealt with in the European Union and in Britain. Insofar as the European Union is concerned, 
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000244, regulates the recognition and 
enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters. 
In terms of the Brussels I Regulation, there are a very limited range of exceptions in which the 
recognition and enforcement of a judgement by EU member stares must be refused. Exceptions 
covered in articles 34-5 and 45(1).245 The exceptions under the aforementioned articles are an 
exhaustive list and include judgements whose recognition would be incompatible with public 
policy, default judgments where the defendant was not served with the originating documents in 
sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, and in a very 
limited range of situations whereby judgements given in proceedings over which the original 
court lacked jurisdiction.246 For purposes of this discussion, the focus shall be solely with regards 
to the public policy ground of refusal to recognise and enforce a judgment. The Court of Justice 
has consistently emphasised that the public policy proviso found under article 34(1) should 
operate only in exceptional circumstances and that the limits of the concept are to be determined 
by the Court of Justice.247 
Recourse to public policy, in order to refuse to recognise and enforce a judgement, can be 
envisaged only where recognition or enforcement of the judgement would be at a variance to an 
unacceptable degree with the legal order as it infringes a fundamental principle of the state.248 
The infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as 
essential in the legal order of the state, or of a right recognised as fundamental within that legal 
order.249 Under article 34(1) there are five identifiable categories under which public policy may 
be invoked. 
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First, despite proper notification of the institution of the original action, a party was in some 
manner or the other denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case, or was otherwise 
prejudiced by the use by the court of a procedure considered to be unfair by the standards of the 
state requested to enforce the judgement.250 Secondly, where the court considers that the 
recognition of the judgement would be unconscionable because of the outrageous character of 
the substantive rule applied by the original court i.e. the court upholding and enforcing a contract 
to pay a fee to an assassin251. Thirdly, where the recognition of the judgement would be contrary 
to the political interests of the state addressed in the conduct of its economic or foreign policies. 
Fourthly, where cogent evidence has been discovered since the judgement was given, but there is 
no manner of reopening the matter in the country of origin.252 Lastly, where there are 
irreconcilable judgements given by courts of different countries and there is no applicable 
provision dictating which of them should prevail.253 
When considering the abovementioned categories, it is clear that the refusal of the High Court 
could adequately fall into the third category due to the rather wide ambit of the number of issues 
which could be seen as fitting into this category. An indication that the High Court‟s reasoning 
was not beyond the realms of legal reasoning. 
When considering the British position on the abovementioned, it is a well-established principle 
of the courts of Britain that no action shall be entertained that would be contrary to the British 
doctrine of public policy. Notwithstanding that the right sought to be enforced was legitimately 
acquired under the laws of the country of origin.254 The bar to the enforcement of a right i.e. 
judgments, can include considerations of public policy at common law. Public policy in this 
sense is with regards to the concept of morality and justice.255 
In practice, British courts have only applied this restraint in circumstances such as where the 
fundamental conceptions of British justice have been disregarded; where the British conception 
of morality has been disregarded; where the enforcement of the transaction would prejudice the 
interests of the United Kingdom or its good relation with foreign powers; lastly where a penal 
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condition of status would be involved offending against British conceptions of human liberty and 
freedom of action.256 In the British context it is accepted that the use of public policy in the 
conflict of laws should be more restricted than in domestic law, its scope narrower.257 
Taking into consideration the position of the European Union and Britain insofar as the 
enforcement of foreign judgments are concerned, it‟s clear that the ever changing concept of 
public policy is a consideration which can legitimately be taken into consideration and used to 
choose not to enforce a foreign judgment. Thereby lending legitimacy to the High Court‟s 
judgment but more specifically the High Court‟s decision to use public policy as the axel upon 
which to rule against the Applicants in enforcing the Tribunals decision. 
When considering the Gramara Case it would seem that what played itself out before the High 
Court was a conflict of laws in the recognition of a foreign judgment. The High Court did not 
specifically set out to deal with this in its judgment but does indirectly make mention of it when 
referring to the enforcement of the Tribunal‟s judgments. The High Court cited article 32 of the 
Protocol and determined that the overall effect of the provision was that the decisions of the 
Tribunal are binding and enforceable, however,  their enforcement was governed by the rules of 
civil procedure of each Member State as mentioned in chapter 3.  
The High Court went on further to correctly side with the Applicants in their argument that 
although Zimbabwe had failed to take any specific internal measures to domesticate the SADC 
Treaty or the Protocol as required,  Zimbabwe could not evade its international obligations by 
invoking its own domestic deficiencies. The Applicants citing the international law principle of 
the “pacta sunt servanda”. 
However, the High Court disagreed with the applicant‟s assertion that states when applying 
domestic law at municipal level must take into consideration their treaty obligations even when a 
clear conflict between the two regimes presents itself. In other words, the Applicants contended 
that states‟ international obligations to SADC took precedence over Zimbabwe‟s municipal laws. 
In disagreeing with this line of argument the High Court stated: 
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“… Route Toute BV & Others v Minister of National Security Responsible for Land, 
Land Reform and Resettlement & Others”258 it was said that “On the pragmatic approach 
that has come to be adopted in international practice, neither legal system enjoys 
primacy over the other. In principle, they both hold sway and supremacy in their 
respective domain… The resultant divergence between the two systems is reconciled on 
the basis that the State incurs international responsibility for having violated its 
international obligations and must accordingly effect the requisite reparations in order to 
satisfy its international responsibility”.259  
The High Court therefore being of the view that international law does not enjoy primacy over 
domestic legislation. Furthermore that should a situation arise whereby a state defaults on its 
treaty obligations as a result of a divergence between the two legal systems, the state would have 
to pay reparations to satisfy its international obligations. Presumably saying that Zimbabwe 
would likely have to resolve the issue through diplomatic channels as opposed to the courts. 
The conflict of laws thereby playing itself out with regards to Zimbabwe‟s domestic laws i.e. the 
supremacy of the constitution and the constitutionally entrenched right to acquire agricultural 
land for purposes of resettlement in accordance with Amendment 17 versus its treaty obligations 
insofar as the SADC Treaty was concerned and Zimbabwe‟s commitments thereto. 
Practically, recognising and enforcing the Tribunals judgment would compel the Zimbabwean 
government to act contrary to a law legally enacted by parliament, what was particularly 
problematic was that the empowering legislation was the constitution and wherein the 
constitution is supposed to be the supreme law of the land. To work around this the High Court 
sought to invoke considerations of public policy in order to refuse to recognise and enforce the 
Tribunals judgment, which as demonstrated has valid legal grounds. 
Lastly, it should be noted that the failure to recognise and enforce foreign judgements is not 
peculiar to Zimbabwe nor the African continent for that matter. In cases where individuals have 
sought to enforce judgments of international courts, national courts have often been reluctant to 
recognise and/or enforce such judgements, for instance in Socobel v Greek State, a company 
                                                          




sought to enforce a judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice before a Belgian 
national court.260  The action failed as a result of the company having not been a party to the 
action before the Permanent Court, the Belgian Court found it inconceivable that a party which 
was not admitted to the bar of an international court could be able to rely on a decision in a case 
to which it was not a party.261  
Furthermore, recently the Supreme Court in the United States held that a judgment of the 
International Court of Justice was not directly enforceable as domestic law and could therefore 
not prevail over state procedural rules.262  A clear example of how murky and muddled the 
waters get when attempting to enforce foreign and/or international court decisions through 
national courts. 
In conclusion, upon having observed the position in South Africa, Britain and the European 
Union with regards to the enforcement of foreign judgments, it is clear the public policy can and 
as demonstrated has been used as reason not to enforce a foreign judgment. In light of this the 
High Court can, at common law, be said to have correctly dealt with the matter in light of the 
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VII Plotting the Way Forward 
In plotting a way forward for the Tribunal it is critical to observe the series of events which 
followed the Campbell Case in order to understand how it is that SADC finds itself at its current 
impasse. Like the old saying goes, you cannot know where you are going unless you know where 
you‟re from. Therefore in plotting a way forward for the Tribunal, it would be amiss not to take 
note as to where the root of the issues for the Tribunal began. 
As set out throughout this paper, in 2008 the Tribunal ruled that the Zimbabwean government‟s 
seizure of agricultural land owned by white farmers violated the SADC Treaty principles on non-
discrimination and the rule of law.263 The situation leading to the litigation had come to a head 
due to the land question in Zimbabwe, which had long been a smouldering political and 
economic problem. The problems associates to the question of land were partly due to acute 
racial inequities in land ownership arising from colonial conquest and white minority rule, 
subsequently entrenched by Zimbabwe‟s negotiated settlement via the Lancaster House 
Agreement.264 
When the Tribunal heard the Campbell case, it noted that the Zimbabwean Supreme Court, the 
country‟s highest court, had recently denied the applicants the right to institute domestic 
proceedings objecting to the seizure of their land.265 The Zimbabwean Supreme Court had 
accepted that its jurisdiction to hear the matter had been ousted by Amendment 17, consequently, 
the Tribunal held that the applicants did not have domestic legal remedies available to them and 
were entitled to lodge their complaint with the regional court. Subsequent to the Tribunals 
decision in the Campbell Case the Zimbabwean government rubbished the decision with 
President Robert Mugabe describing the decision as “an exercise in futility”266, and so began his 
government‟s campaign to emasculate the Tribunal and nullify its rulings. 
The Tribunal‟s decision was viewed in Harare as an intolerable interference in the country‟s 
domestic affairs.267 In 2009 the Zimbabwean Minister of Justice, Patrick Chinamasa, announced 
that his government had withdrawn from the Tribunal‟s jurisdiction. He argued that the regional 
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court was not legally constituted because its Protocol had not been ratified by two-thirds of the 
Member States, a requirement that he said was stipulated in the Protocol.268 This argument was 
still born from conception, as Chinamasa relied on an outdated version of the Protocol which had 
subsequently been revised in 2001 and scrapped the requirement he relied on to found his 
argument. On three occasions the Tribunal referred Zimbabwe‟s failure to obey its rulings to the 
Summit for appropriate action and on each occasion the Summit declined to act.269 
It would seem that for Zimbabwe the Summit‟s passivity was not sufficient as the Zimbabwean 
government also wanted to ensure that the Tribunal‟s rulings were rendered void.270 To this end, 
Chinamasa successfully lobbied his ministerial counterparts sitting in the Council to support 
Harare‟s stance.271 In 2010, after the annual Summit meeting, he announced that the heads of 
state had suspended the Tribunal for six months pending the outcome of a review by the region‟s 
justice ministers and attorney generals.272 Following the 2010 Summit meeting, the SADC 
Secretariat commissioned an independent review of the Tribunal.273 The review was undertaken 
by Lorend Bartels from the University of Cambridge, the review affirmed the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal and vindicated its decisions.274 
Notwithstanding the review by Lorend Bartels, in 2011 the Summit resolved to continue with the 
moratorium placed on the Tribunal thus suspending the Tribunals operation. Furthermore, the 
Summit resolved not to renew the terms of judges sitting on the Tribunal whose terms were 
expiring whilst also deciding not to appoint new judges to replace those out going, this would 
eventually bring about the effective disbandment of the Tribunal as all the judges of the 
Tribunal‟s terms expired either in 2010 or 2011. Whilst the moratorium was in effect the 
ministers of justice and attorney generals of the Member States continued with their review and 
redrafting of the Protocol, the fruits of which would spawn the New Protocol discussed in 
chapter 4. 










Having noted the legal and political flashpoints giving rise to the impasse surrounding the 
Tribunal, it is clear that the biggest issue which has dogged the Tribunal is its enforcement 
capabilities. As previously stated, article 32 of the Protocol requires that any failure by a 
Member State to comply with a decision of the Tribunal is to be referred to the Tribunal, to 
which if the Tribunal establishes the existence of such failure, shall report its findings to the 
Summit for appropriate action. 
The issues surrounding article 32 of the Protocol are clear when looking at Zimbabwe‟s failure to 
uphold the interim orders restraining the Zimbabwean government from removing the applicants 
or allowing their removal from their land. This as well as various other orders such as directing 
government to refrain from taking steps that would interfere with the peaceful residence on and 
beneficial use of the applicants‟ property, as well as the failure to abide by the Tribunal‟s 
decision in the Campbell Case. 
All of the abovementioned were referred to the Tribunal in terms of Article 32(4) with the 
Tribunal ruling in favour of the Applicants and referring the matters to the Summit for 
“appropriate action” in terms of Article 32(5), to which no follow up action was taken by the 
Summit. Thereby rendering the work of the Tribunal in vein, the lack of enforcement capabilities 
of the Tribunal and the Summit‟s pandering to political considerations as opposed to the rule of 
law has not been remedied by the New Protocol. Article 44 of the New Protocol is in essence a 
carbon copy of its predecessor article 32, therefore clearly the problems associated with 
enforcement have not been remedied. 
With this in mind, going forward it would be prudent for SADC to consider adopting the 
approach of the Court of Justice, which in terms of article 260(2) of the TFEU enable the Court 
of Justice to impose a financial penalty on member states which fail to comply with its 
judgements. However, merely bestowing the Tribunal with penal jurisdiction insofar as failure 
by states to comply with the Tribunal judgments doesn‟t fully resolve the issue of enforcement as 
the issue is twofold. 
Certainly granting the Tribunal with the power to impose penalties would be a step in the right 
direction, however the final piece in the puzzle to solving this issue would be more robust action 
by the Summit when Member States fail to observe the judgments of the Tribunal i.e. economic 
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embargoes. As what good are penalties if there are no consequences for Member States who fail 
to adhere to them. Therefore the Summit is key and critical to the proper functioning of the 
Tribunal and SADC as a whole. Thus the necessary political will by the Heads of State must be 
found before the Tribunal shall be able to function, otherwise the institution is merely another 
paper tiger. 
With regards to “political will”, questions can also be asked about SADC‟s integration model 
with specific reference being with regards to the appropriateness of SADC adopting a market 
integration model or “customs unions” model in its approach to integration. Evidence of this can 
be solicited from SADC‟s RISDP, which as mentioned in chapter 1 is SADC‟s road map to 
providing strategic direction to SADC in achieving its long term goals. The RISDP indicates that 
SADC‟s thinking with regards to achieving its aim of integration, is to follow the classic linear 
model of integration by way of establishing a Free Trade Area initially, moving onto a customs 
union and eventually establishing a monetary union with a common currency.275 This is very 
much in the same vain as the approach of the European Union as evidenced by the aims of the 
EC as set out in chapter 2. The aforementioned once again adding to the ever growing narrative 
that SADC has adopted a wholly Eurocentric approach to integration. 
One of the many issues with following the Eurocentric approach to African integration is the 
assumptions made under the Customs Union Theory to integration. Assumptions such as that, 
“trade within each country is assumed to be perfectly competitive; full employment is implied; 
problems of adjustment in connection with the formation of a customs union are disregarded”.276 
The aforementioned assumptions are problematic due to the fact that even at the time of the 
theories development it was not in tuned with the reality of the economies found in Europe and 
accordingly is even less in tune with the African context. There are numerous examples to 
illustrate how the above assumptions are not applicable to Africa but perhaps none more so than 
the fact that in South Africa, SADC‟s strongest economy, unemployment is currently estimated 
to be at 25.4%.277 
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In light of the above, it is questionable why a linear approach has been favoured as opposed to 
perhaps a developmental approach as that provided for by the “Development Integration 
Model”278 a model more in tune with the issues faced in third world countries. For instance, the 
Developmental Integration Model favours political cooperation at a high level as a prerequisite 
for implementation as opposed to being the final stage of integration as envisioned by the 
Customs Union theory.279 An approach to integration premised on greater political cooperation 
could in turn have positive effects for the operation of the Tribunal insofar as that although 
individual access to the Tribunal has been abolished, a Tribunal able to set judicial precedents for 
domestic courts on the application of the SADC Treaty as mentioned in chapter 4, coupled with 
political cooperation would likely give rise to better enforcement of the SADC Treaty. As 
governments could seek diplomatic situations to judgments they have issue with. 
Another little known issue facing SADC and the Tribunal is that of the organisations funding 
constraints and the leverage exacted upon SADC and its institutions by foreign donors. Although 
Article 33 of the Protocol and Article 45 of the New Protocol provide that the budget of the 
Tribunal shall be from the annual budget of SADC, the reality of this is that in 2004 SADC 
received approximately eighty percent of its project funding from the European Union and other 
foreign sources making SADC extremely vulnerable to donor leverage280. Academics have 
argued that this leverage is not hypothetical as in 2005 Western donors withdrew their support 
for the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, which was utilized as a shared SADC facility, 
because of Zimbabwe‟s human rights abuses.281 
The threat of donor leverage whether real or perceived cannot be discounted when as recently as 
2011 it was expected that seventy two percent of SADC‟s total budget was expected to come 
from foreign funders. Furthermore there is evidence to suggest that the Tribunal was always a 
donor driven initiative, Tobias Lenz draws on records of the SADC Council of Ministers to show 
that in the late 1990s the organization‟s donors had become increasingly dissatisfied with 
SADC‟s failure to meet its objectives, thus threatening to cut their funding and were calling for 
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the creation of a dispute settlement mechanism that would press Member States to abide by their 
commitments282. 
The drafters of the Protocol, who included a British judge funded by the European Community, 
emulated the features of the Court of Justice in order to alleviate these donor concerns and 
enhance, in donors eyes, the credibility of SADC‟s court and regional integration mission.283 
Accordingly, the influence of a British judge in the drafting of the Protocol explains the 
similarities found in the institutional structure of the Tribunal with those in the Court of Justice. 
As mentioned in chapter 4 the distrust of the Tribunal, real or perceived, by Member States likely 
stems from the interference in SADC‟s affairs by international donours as early as in the drafting 
of the Protocol.  
When looking at the issue surrounding the SADC‟s funding and the history of the Tribunal, it is 
obvious that the decisions of the Tribunal were always going to be looked upon with suspicion. 
Therefore opening up SADC and more specifically the Tribunal to scathing political attacks from 
dissatisfied Member States with the Zimbabwean newspaper The Herald concluding that “[if] he 
who pays the piper calls the tune, then SADC is not in control of its affairs at all”.284 
 To circumvent this form of attack which invariably delegitimises the Tribunal and SADC as a 
whole, SADC‟s budget should be funded wholly by Member States if Member States are truly 
serious about making the organisation work. Whilst none of the Member States have advanced 
funds for SADC‟s budget, it is hard to see the Summit forgoing years of solidarity, forged 
decades ago whilst each nation battled collectively against colonialism, minority rule, Apartheid 
and the western allies of those regimes285, and take action against one another for failing to abide 
by the Tribunals decisions.   
Finally, much has been written about the loss of the Tribunals human rights jurisdiction as a 
result of the New Protocols diminished jurisdiction as set out in chapter 4. The question that 
should be asked is whether the observance of human rights should be a regional issue, the 
fulfilment of which should be monitored by the Member States, or whether it is an issue which 
                                                          
282Nathan op cit note 6 at 883 
283 Ibid at 883 
284 Ibid  
285 Ibid at 884 
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should be dealt with not regionally but continentally by the African Union, more specifically the 
African Court of Human and Peoples Rights an institution of the African Union. 
On one hand, dealing with the actions brought by natural persons at the regional level in theory 
alleviates the workload on the African Court of Human and Peoples rights and is likely to ensure 
greater access to justice as well as a more expedient process. However, in the same vain, it 
hardly can be argued that the court‟s case load is such that it requires the establishment of a 
lower courts vis a vis the General Court. Perhaps regional courts such as the Tribunal should be 
focused on matters pertaining to economic integration in order to streamline the process of faster 
regional integration. 
The solution is not clear though one would imagine that it would be preferable the African Court 
of Human and People‟s Rights have a body of work that regional courts, like the Tribunal, could 
draw guidance from in the in the guise of the doctrine of stare decisis in order for there to be a 
uniform application of human rights decisions across the continent and regionally. Accordingly, 
perhaps it is or was slightly premature for the Tribunal to begin with a human rights mandate 
before the African Court of Human and Peoples Rights had as yet established itself on the 
continent as the final arbiter on matters pertaining to human rights violations. 
Therefore going forward SADC Member States should consider granting the Tribunal a 
modicum of penal jurisdiction insofar as situations whereby Member States deliberately refuse to 
abide by its ruling. Secondly, serious thought should be given to abandoning the current Customs 
Union theory of linear progression in favour of a model more in tune with the African continents 
peculiar set of circumstances. The Development Integration model is suggested as possibly more 
suited to the challenges faced by the continent. Finally, a concrete commitment to fund the work 
of the organisation is critical and this all revolves around political will. The Member States need 
to fully buy into the organisations aims and objectives before it can be successful, short cited 
decision making aimed at satisfying national constituencies at the expense of the regional agenda 
must come to an end if SADC is ever to reach its full potential. This can be done by starting with 
an issue as simple as funding, Heads of State fearful of committing already constrained national 
budgets to SADC initiatives due to the domestic backlash they are likely to face, must put these 




























When looking back at the saga which played itself out with regards to the Tribunal as well as the 
Campbell Case, the question which remains to be answered is whether or not the disbandment 
and subsequent resurrection of the Tribunal means the end of private individuals ability to hold 
states accountable at regional level. When looking through the contents of the New Protocol, it is 
apparent that the answer is yes, the will of the Summit in this regard is clear. The truly 
unfortunate aspect of this is that it is difficult to comprehend what role the resurrected Tribunal 
shall play regionally, as the rebooted Tribunal has effectively been reduced to a passenger in 
SADC‟s institutional machinery. Unlike the Court of Justice, a Tribunal without the power to 
even hold Member States accountable for their actions can aptly be described as a “paper tiger”. 
The question of land is an acute one which has plagued Zimbabwe for decades. From the outset 
of the Campbell Case the Applicants in their submissions acknowledged the governments 
legitimate aim of redressing the imbalances created during the colonial period insofar as land 
was concerned. The legitimacy of the aim being unquestionable. It is clear that a variety of 
factors and agents played a part in causing the situation to spiral into the lawlessness that was 
witnessed towards the turn of the millennium. Factors such as the complicit conduct of the 
government of the United Kingdom in relation to the Lancaster House Agreement, all too often 
overlooked when addressing the issues surrounding Zimbabwe. However, taking that into 
account, what cannot be forgotten is the unsatisfactory manner in which the land redistribution 
program was carried out by the government of Zimbabwe.  
The truly unfortunate aspect being how a legitimate policy goal was irrevocably marred by 
intimidation and violence which resulted in human rights abuses and the displacement of 
thousands of Zimbabweans, the likes of whom were intended to be the beneficiaries of  the 
program. The vast majority would end up victims of the program rather than beneficiaries, a 
cruel irony. In this regard, culpability lays at the feet of the government of Zimbabwe and 
perhaps indirectly at the door of the Summit due to its hands off approach as seen with its 
inaction during the Campbell Case. 
Member States in the region, such as South Africa, whom have found the “willing buyer willing 
seller” principle problematic when attempting to execute land redistribution can learn a lot from 
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the events which unfolded in Zimbabwe. No lesson more critical than that land redistribution is a 
volatile subject with various dimensions and should not be approached hastily. An opportunity to 
showcase how to legitimately redress spatial inequalities was missed in Zimbabwe, one can only 
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